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THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS—THE NEED TO REVISIT THE NCAA’S
“NO AGENT RULE”
John P. Sahl*
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the primary
governing body for intercollegiate athletics, promulgated its “No Agent
Rule” in 1974 prohibiting advisors of student-athletes from communicating and negotiating with professional sports teams. As part of a core
principle of amateurism, the NCAA adopted this rule, in part, to delineate between professional athletes and student athletes. However,
through economic and societal evolution, this policy is antiquated and
detrimental to the personal and professional development of college athletes.
This Article argues in favor of expanding the recent Rice Commission’s recommendation, adopted by the NCAA, to grant an exception
from the No Agent Rule for Men’s Division I elite basketball players to
all college sports and levels of competition. The NCAA’s landscape for
governing college athletics has undergone many recent changes, some
of which strengthen the notion that all student-athletes would benefit
from earlier access to agent advice and assistance. The Changing Landscape of Intercollegiate Athletics—The Need to Revisit the NCAA’s “No
Agent Rule” discusses this need by first detailing the evolution of NCAA
governance, followed by an analysis of the Gatto decision and its impact
on the Rice Commission’s report promoting an exception to the No Agent
Rule for Division I Men’s elite basketball players.
Finally, this article recommends that because of the changed and
ever-evolving landscape of college sports, the NCAA should abandon its
No Agent Rule in favor of a Modified Agent Rule (MAR). The MAR
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would enable all student-athletes to contract with sports agents subject
to some NCAA oversight to protect student-athletes from agent abuse
and to support the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism. The MAR promises to alleviate some of the stress and challenges that hinder all studentathletes, especially gifted athletes, when assessing how and by what
means to enter the professional sports level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has long
governed amateur collegiate athletics like a watchful overlord, relying
on a maze of byzantine-like rules to promote, in large part, its institutional self-interests.1 These rules have enabled the NCAA to wield broad

1. GERALD GURNEY, DONNA A. LOPIANO & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNWINDING
MADNESS: WHAT WENT WRONG WITH COLLEGE SPORTS AND HOW TO FIX IT 16 (2017)
[hereinafter GURNEY] (describing the maze of byzantine-like rules in the NCAA Manual as
being over “a thousand pages long, [with an extensive] list of quixotic regulations that purport
to uphold amateurism . . . .”); see John P. Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection:
What’s Left After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.
Ct. 454 (1988)?, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621, 624 (1989) (describing the NCAA as the “overlord of
college sports”); see also id. at 622 (contending, contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in
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authority over its members to enforce rule compliance. The end result
of NCAA’s rules and broad authority is clear—the NCAA remains the
leading force in college athletics with university presidents, the public,
and others seeking its imprimatur.2
The steady stream of news reports about college sports and the
NCAA highlights their importance in our nation’s daily affairs.3 The
public has a seemingly insatiable appetite for information and stories
about athletics, including NCAA athletics.4 This appetite is fueled by
24/7 sports coverage in a wide variety of outlets and platforms.5 Some
of the stories are positive, for example, when a collegiate championship

Tarkanian, that “college students should be entitled to constitutional due process before being
deprived of their athletic eligibility”).
2. One example of “others” seeking NCAA approval would include commercial vendors, like Nike and Coca-Cola, who provide products to coaches, athletes, and fans. The
NCAA’s broad authority may have diminished slightly over the last half-century. See Taylor
Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/. Students of
NCAA history can point to different benchmarks to show this gradual erosion of unbridled
authority. Certainly, one key development in this erosion occurred in 1984 when the University of Oklahoma Board of Regents successfully challenged the NCAA’s rules limiting the
televising of college football games on antitrust grounds. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119-20 (1984). The case undermined the NCAA’s absolute control over college football, a key source of revenue, and signaled to many that the NCAA’s
power was not absolute, foreshadowing further lawsuits to curtail at least perceived NCAA
abuses of power. One such lawsuit was NCAA v. Miller, in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the Nevada law violated the dormant commerce clause by unduly burdening interstate commerce by requiring NCAA members to provide student athletes with certain due process protections. 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993).
3. See, e.g., NCAA presidents set revised financial distribution to support college athletes, NCAA (Mar. 26, 2020, 1:23 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-presidents-set-revised-financial-distribution-support-college-athletes; see also,
e.g., Ryan Lewis, Indians announce plans to extend protective Netting at Progressive Field
for 2020 season, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 29, 2020, 11:51 AM), https://www.beaconjournal.com/sports/20200129/indians-announce-plans-to-extend-protective-netting—progressive-field-for-2020-season (reporting all thirty teams in Major League Baseball will be extending netting after several serious incidents of fans being injured by foul balls); The Jim
Rome Show (CBS Sports Radio 2020) (providing biweekly sports radio talk including sixtysecond commentaries on the day’s top sports headlines).
4. See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 9 (2000)
[hereinafter Smith] (underscoring the public’s interest in sports, one expert referred to sport
as “the religion of the American people” and noted “[a]s a people, we seem almost fixated on
sport and devote much space in newspapers and newscasts to sport, with little space being
allocated to religion”).
5. See,
e.g.,
ESPN:
COLLEGE
FOOTBALL
NATION
BLOG,
https://www.espn.com/blog/ncfnation (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); see also, e.g., BLEACHER
REP., https://bleacherreport.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); see also, e.g., 247 SPORTS,
https://247sports.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
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sports team is invited to meet with the President of the United States6 at
the White House or when a university’s team engages in charitable activities.7
Some of the stories are negative and cause a public stir.8 For example, a recent investigation found that “college athletes punished for
sexual assault routinely transfer and keep playing in the NCAA.”9 This
is unsettling news, especially given the #MeToo Movement and other
recent efforts to raise national awareness about the significance of sexual
assaults against the backdrop of high-profile sexual assault cases

6. The 2020 NCAA Division I football champions, Louisiana State University Tigers,
visited with President Trump at the White House. Trump honors national champion LSU Tigers at the White House, CBS NEWS (Jan. 17, 2020, 4:47 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lsu-tigers-college-football-national-champions-visit-whitehouse-today-2020-01-17/.
7. See, e.g., WKYC Staff, ‘We Roar with Emma’: Akron Zips hold Saturday basketball
doubleheader to benefit Norton teen, WKYC STUDIOS (Jan. 17, 2020, 7:52 PM),
https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/local/summit-county/we-roar-with-emma-akron-zipssaturday-basketball-doubleheader-to-benefit-norton-teen/95-94eb0df8-ea73-4098-b0d004d74f734e56 (explaining that the proceeds of a basketball game between the University of
Akron Zips and the University of Toledo Rockets were donated to help a local athlete at
Wadsworth High School who was recovering from injuries and a coma). Of course, professional sports teams and figures also attract positive coverage for similar publicly spirited
work. See Cleveland Cavaliers, Cavs Players Serve Thanksgiving Dinner to Local Families,
NBA (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nba.com/cavaliers/community/thanksgiving-dinner181120; John Pana, Cleveland Cavaliers players, coaches, serve Thanksgiving dinner to
young students (video), CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cleveland.com/cavs/2017/11/cavs_players_and_coaches_serve.html; see also Marla Ridenour,
Three-point bonus: Cavaliers’ Cedi Osman, Larry Nance Jr. donate $10,000 for Turkey earthquake relief, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 26, 2020, 6:06 PM), https://www.beaconjournal.com/sports/20200126/three-point-bonus-cavaliersrsquo-cedi-osman-larry-nance-jr-donate-10000-for-turkey-earthquake-relief. News of a terrible earthquake in Turkey prompted
Cedi Osman, who plays for the Turkish National Team, and Larry Nance of the Cleveland
Cavaliers to donate $100 and $200 respectively for each successful three-point shot made by
the Cavaliers in a game against the Chicago Bulls on January 25, 2020. Id. The donations
were to help with the relief effort in Turkey. Id.
8. Although this article focuses on the NCAA, college athletics, and the NCAA’s regulation of agents, professional athletics also generates both positive and negative stories. For
example, the cheating scandal involving baseball and the Houston Astros attracted national
attention, shocking many fans and others. See Astros fire manager, GM after suspensions for
sign-stealing,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jan.
13,
2020),
https://apnews.com/a35c982320cd4a4986aef75727957c5c; see also Ryan Lewis, Figuring out signs
has its place in baseball, but Astros committed theft, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 13, 2020, 5:09
PM), https://www.beaconjournal.com/sports/20200113/ryan-lewis-figuring-out-signs-hasits-place-in-baseball-but-astros-committed-theft.
9. Kenny Jacoby, NCAA president deflects blame on sexual assault policy, USA TODAY
(Dec.
18,
2019,
7:07
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/12/18/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-deflects-blame-sexual-assault-policy/2693095001/.
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involving Bill Cosby,10 Harvey Weinstein,11 and Jeffery Epstein.12 In
response to news about such controversial transfers, the NCAA President, Mark Emmert, said the schools admitting these transfers bear responsibility for this situation, while some university leaders instead point
the finger of responsibility at the NCAA.13 The NCAA’s refusal to accept any responsibility for these transfers or to outline a course of action
to address this problem is problematic. The NCAA missed an opportunity to take a leadership role on an important social issue and to highlight its concern for student safety.
One important takeaway from some of these stories about the
NCAA and intercollege athletics is that the current NCAA landscape for
governing intercollegiate athletics is significantly changing, buffeted by
tsunami-like challenges to its authority and business model.14 One

10. Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2019); see
Maryclaire Dale, Bill Cosby sex assault verdict upheld; spokesman lashes out, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/2f4b9e6b0da6980411b4f3080434d21b.
11. See Chris Francescani & Alexandra Svokos, Harvey Weinstein found guilty on 2
counts in sexual assault case, ABC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2020, 12:09 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/jury-reaches-verdict-harvey-weinsteincase/story?id=69175544; see also Chris Francescani & Aaron Katersky, Harvey Weinstein
sentenced to 23 Years on sex crime convictions, ABC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020, 9:29 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/harvey-weinstein-despondent-faces-sentencingyork/story?id=69516249.
12. United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see Christina
Carrega, Stephanie Wash & Bill Hutchinson, Millionaire Jeffrey Epstein’s sex-trafficking trial
set for next year; a million pages of discovery expected, ABC NEWS (July 31, 2019, 2:24 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/millionaire-jeffrey-epsteins-sex-trafficking-trial-setyear/story?id=64678798.
13. Jacoby, supra note 9.
14. The Rice Commission noted that the more serious and confounding challenges to
NCAA authority and its business model are the “legal challenges to its amateurism rule under
antitrust and employment theories” (citing, in part In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 4:14-md-2541-CW (N.D. CA 2014)) (“[C]hallenging the failure to
pay Division I Men’s and Women’s Basketball and FBS football players the difference in the
value of an athletic scholarship and the full cost of attendance”); Jenkins v. NCAA, Civil
Action 12-CV-3:33-av-0001 (D.N.J. 2014) (“[C]hallenging agreement not to compete for services of Division I Men’s and FBS players as a violation of the antitrust laws without legitimate pro-competitive purposes . . . .”). COMM’N ON COLL. BASKETBALL, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 22 n.17
(2018) [hereinafter RICE COMMISSION or RICE REPORT]; see also Nw. Univ. & College Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1368 (Aug. 17, 2015) (challenging the NCAA’s amateurism rule and business model under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) when student-athletes sought union certification and ultimately deciding that NU football players who
received grant-in-aid scholarships were employees under NLRA § 2(3)). The Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rejected NU’s argument that they were
“primarily students” because, in part, scholarship players spend more time per-week on football-related activities than school-related activities and are subject to strict control all year.
The full NLRB vacated the regional director’s ruling “without deciding whether the scholarship players are statutory employees under Section 2(3).” Id. at 1355. Instead, the Board
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important example of such change was the court’s 2013 decision in
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.15
Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball star, and a group of current and former college football and men’s basketball players filed an
antitrust class action in 2013 against the NCAA.16 They alleged that
NCAA rules prohibiting athletes from making money from their name,
image, and likeness (NIL) violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.17 The
district court ruled the NCAA’s no compensation rules were an “unlawful restraint of trade”—marking the first time a federal court found that
NCAA’s amateurism rules violated antitrust laws.18
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge’s decision in O’Bannon that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust review,
but vacated the “judgement and injunction insofar as they require[d] the
NCAA to allow its member schools to pay student-athletes up to $5,000
per year in deferred [NIL] compensation.”19 The court believed paying

declined to assert jurisdiction in this case because it would “not effectuate the policies of the
[NLRA] . . .” in promoting uniformity and stability in labor relations, given the “nature of
league sports and the NCAA’s oversight [that] renders individual team bargaining problematic. . . .” Id. at 1352-54. The NLRB’s decision to sidestep the important question of whether
scholarship players are employees raises the ominous specter for the NCAA that student athletes should have more of a voice in college sports, including earning compensation. At the
very least, the NLRB’s pass on the important question of whether college athletes are employees added new impetus to the school of thought that student athletes are employees and entitled to greater legal protection and economic rewards. See generally Michael Pego, The Delusion of Amateurism in College Sports: Why Scholarship Student Athletes Are Destined to
Be Considered “Employees” Under the NLRA, 13 FIU L. REV. 277 (2018).
15. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
16. Id. at 1055-56. O’Bannon “visited a friend’s house, where his friend’s son told
O’Bannon that he was depicted in a college video game produced by Electronics Arts (EA),
a software company, that produced video games based on college football and men’s basketball games from late 1990s to around 2013.”
17. Id. at 1049, 1052; see also The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)
(Trusts, etc., In Restraint of Trade Illegal; Penalty). The NCAA’s rules barring compensation
for NIL are subject to antitrust laws because amateurism rules are not categorically valid,
involve commercial activity in which student-athletes anticipate compensation, and have an
anti-competitive effect on the college market.
18. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1052-53. Senior District Court Judge Claudia Wilkens conducted a bench trial and ruled that the NCAA’s amateurism rules prohibiting NILs compensation constituted an unlawful restraint of trade and issued an injunction that the NCAA
change its practices. To review Judge Wilkens’ thoughtful decision, see O’Bannon v. NCAA,
7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (affirmed in part, vacated in part by O’Bannon v.
NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)).
19. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. The NCAA bylaws define a student-athlete as
a student whose enrollment was solicited by a member of the athletic staff or other
representative of athletics interests with a view toward the student’s ultimate participation in the intercollegiate athletics program. Any other student becomes a student-athlete only when the student reports for an intercollegiate squad that is under
the jurisdiction of the athletics department, as specified in the Constitution. 3.2.4.6.
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“cash sums untethered to educational expenses” destroyed any pretense
of amateurism and threatened the very existence of NCAA amateur athletics.20 Perhaps more importantly, the same court affirmed the trial
court’s injunction requiring the NCAA to permit its members to raise the
grant-in-aid or scholarship cap to cover the full cost of attendance.21 The
O’Bannon decision heralded a new era of compensation for student-athletes, entitling them to a share of the NIL revenue based on their athletic
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 DIVISION I MANUAL, ART. 12, §
12.02.14 at 62 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]; see Chuck Provencio, Student-Athlete: A Study of Student-Athlete Workload Compared with Traditional Student Workload (2016) (thesis, Paper No. 1054, South Dakota State University), https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2053&context=etd (noting a study that
defines a student-athlete as someone who receives a scholarship in exchange for athletic
participation; this definition excludes the population of “walk-ons” or student-athletes
without scholarship).
20. “Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and
no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078. The appellate majority
found . . . there is a concrete procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment to
amateurism: namely that the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their appeal to consumers. We therefore conclude that the NCAA’s compensation rules
serve two procompetitive purposes identified by the district court: integrating academics with athletics, and ‘preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product by
promoting its current understanding of amateurism.’
Id. at 1073. However, the dissent agreed with the District Court and noted,
[t]he national debate about amateurism in college sports is important. But our task
as appellate judges is not to resolve it . . . . Our task is simply to review the district
court judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust law and under the appropriate standard of review. In the end, my disagreement with the majority is founded on
the appropriate standard of review. After an extensive bench trial, the district court
made a factual finding that payment of $5,000 in deferred compensation would not
significantly reduce consumer demand for college sports.
Id. at 1083 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 1075, 1079. “A compensation cap set at student-athletes’ full cost of attendance
is a substantially less restrictive alternative means of accomplishing the NCAA’s legitimate
procompetitive purposes.” Id. at 1075. The NCAA defines COA as the “amount calculated by
an institutional financial aid office, using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of
tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses
[“e.g., . . . childcare costs, costs related to a disability and miscellaneous personal expenses”
see § 15.02.2.1] related to attendance at the institution.” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, §
15.02.2. See also Bill Rabinowitz, Athletic director Gene Smith discusses Ohio State football,
playoff, transfers and more, BUCKEYEXTRA (Feb. 9, 2020, 5:31 AM), https://www.buckeyextra.com/sports/20200209/athletic-director-gene-smith-discusses-ohio-state-football-playofftransfers-and-more. The longstanding Ohio State University Athletic Director, Gene Smith,
was asked about one of the NCAA Committees he served on that was addressing the NIL
issue. Smith stated:
I think it [i.e. NILs] won’t be resolved until 2021. We need federal assistance to
come up with something as standard across the country. You can’t have all these
states having different laws. Otherwise, this thing falls apart. We have to do something with NIL, and the more I got into it, the more I realized there are things we
can do that can be regulated. There are things that will require minimum legislation.
There are things that are going to require major regulation.
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services.22 In O’Bannon’s wake, collegiate athletics programs across the
nation still struggle to balance their budgets to cover the full cost of attendance.23
The Changing Landscape of Intercollegiate Athletics—The Need to
Revisit the NCAA’s “No Agent Rule” (No Agent Rule), examines the
NCAA’s regulation of agents given recent economic and societal
changes impacting its business model,24 especially in light of the recent
report by the blue ribbon NCAA task force, the Rice Commission on
College Basketball.25 NCAA President, Mark Emmert, created the commission after the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York reported “the arrest of ten persons for involvement in fraud and
corruption schemes related to college basketball.”26
Part II of this article briefly describes the NCAA’s history and its
efforts to create and enforce intercollegiate athletic rules promoting important principles, such as amateurism27 and fundamental purposes, such
as maintaining “a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate and
professional sports.”28 This background discussion is important for a
fuller understanding of the NCAA’s longstanding and controversial principle of amateurism that generally prohibits student-athletes and their

22. But see Nw. Univ. & College Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. 1350,
1350, 2015 NLRB LEXIS 613, *1, 204 L.R.R.M. 1001, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P15,999,
362 NLRB No. 167 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 2015) (declining to assert jurisdiction over Northwestern’s petition to treat student athletes receiving grant-in-aid scholarships as university employees).
23. Telephone Interview with Lawrence R. Williams, Athletic Dir., Univ. of Akron Athletic Director (Apr. 7, 2020) (confirming the struggle to balance university athletic budgets
given the need to cover the full cost of attendance). See Elton Alexander, New NCAA rule
adds money to athletic scholarships, but can strain athletic budgets, CLEVELAND.COM,
https://www.cleveland.com/sports/college/2015/05/new_ncaa_rule_adds_money_to_at.html
(last updated Jan. 11, 2019).
24. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
25. RICE REPORT, supra note 14. For a list of the Rice Commission’s distinguished members, see infra note 192.
26. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. The ten individuals included “four NCAA Division I college basketball coaches, the head of Global Sports Marketing–Basketball and two
individuals affiliated with a major athletic apparel company, and three athletic advisors.” Id.;
United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying defendants’ joint
motion to dismiss the indictment); see Part IV infra for a more detailed discussion of Gatto.
27. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.9 (“Student-athletes should be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education, and
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.”).
28. Id. § 1.3.1 (highlighting the NCAA’s longstanding “basic purpose” to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”) (emphasis added).
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families from using an “agent for the purpose of marketing his or her
athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”29
Part III of the No Agent Rule examines the representational role of
sports agents. This part discusses the key services that agents offer athletes in helping them to realize their full potential in sports and other
related endeavors. Part III also considers national and state laws affecting agent conduct.
Part IV discusses United States v. Gatto and its connection to the
NCAA’s Commission on College Basketball.30 This commission, commonly referred to as the Rice Commission, in recognition of its Chair,
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, has already impacted intercollegiate sports.31
The Rice Commission’s work supports, if not portends, additional regulatory changes to intercollegiate athletics, in particular, the NCAA’s
rules governing the relationship between agents and student-athletes.
Part V examines interdisciplinary literature and surveys that provide a valuable context for assessing the merits of the NCAA’s general
rule barring student-athlete access to agents. This part balances the potential benefits and detriments of extending the Rice Commission’s
29. Id. § 12.3.1.
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or
she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an
agency contract not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall
be deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible to participate in any sport . . . .
Id. The NCAA’s amateurism principle and its general ban on student athletes using sports
agents generates substantial literature, much of it critical. See generally, e.g., Christopher M.
Hartley, Double Fault: How the NCAA’s No-Agent Rule Serves Legal and Policy Errors Into
the Courts of Tennis, 72 ARK. L. REV. 553 (2020); Alicia Jessop, Students First: The Need for
Adoption of Education and Incentive-Based Sport Agent Policies by NCAA Division I FBS
Member Institutions, 29 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 197 (2019); Sarah Lytal, Ending the Amateurism Façade—Pay College Athletes, 9 HOUS. L. REV. 158 (2019); Cody J. McDavis, The
Value of Amateurism, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275 (2018); Seth Myers, An Intentional
Foul: Corruption in NCAA Basketball & The Aftermath of the 2017 Scandal, 15 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (2019). Although the NCAA rule restricting the use of
agents is the focus of this article, it is only one of several NCAA rules enforcing amateurism.
See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL supra note 19, §§ 12.2.7, 12.1.3.
30. United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019).
31. For example, the NCAA adopted several Rice Commission recommendations, including a new, albeit limited, agent certification program for only elite Division I Men’s Basketball players. NCAA Enforcement Certification and Approvals Group (ECAG), Agent Certification
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
NCAA
(Aug.
8,
2019),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/enforcement/ecag/agent/ECAG_AgentCertificationFAQ.pdf. See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note
19, § 15.01.5.2.1 (authorizing financial aid based on certain conditions to support former basketball student-athletes who wish to return to college and complete their first baccalaureate
degree).
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recommendation for elite Division I Men’s Basketball players access to
agents to all intercollegiate athletes. Part V identifies several compelling
reasons why student-athletes may need and benefit from the assistance
of sports agents. Part V finds that the benefits of agents outweigh any
risks and that such risks can be ameliorated by less restrictive regulatory
measures, such as heightened agent oversight, than the current broad ban
against agents.
Part VI suggests that, due to recent changes in intercollegiate sports,
the time is ripe for the NCAA to adopt a Modified Agent Rule (MAR)
permitting all student-athletes to enjoy the professional assistance of
NCAA certified agents. The adoption of such a policy need not undermine the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism.
The conclusion recommends the NCAA abandon its general ban on
sports agents and replace it as soon as possible with a MAR. The MAR
would incorporate some of the current NCAA restrictions concerning
sports agents and also adopt provisions from other regulatory regimes,
like the Revised Uniform Athlete Agent Act (RUAAA).32 Such a change
will promote student-athlete welfare by alleviating some of the personal
stress and other unique challenges impeding student-athlete success.
II. THE NCAA—THE OVERLORD OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS
The concept that the NCAA functions like an “overlord” regarding
college athletics is not new and has been discussed by scholars,33 current
and former student-athletes,34 and media sources.35 The term reflects the
NCAA’s enormous power and control over the college sports industry.
Like any industry overlord, changing the way the NCAA does business
can be complex and difficult, often requiring public or other outside
pressure.36
32. See infra Part II, Section B (discussing the RUAAA).
33. See Sahl, supra note 1, at 624-40; Joe Nocera & Ben Strauss, Here’s How The NCAA
Hurts College Athletes, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/02/27/how-ncaa-hurts-college-players/.
34. Jenni Fink, 89 Percent of College Varsity Athletes Think NCAA Takes Advantage of
Student Athletes, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 6, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/enforcement/ecag/agent/ECAG_AgentCertGuidelines.pdf; Katelyn Ohashi, Everyone Made Money Off My N.C.A.A. Career, Except Me, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/katelyn-ohashi-fair-play-act.html.
35. Jamil Smith, The NCAA Will Evolve, or Die, ROLLINGSTONE (Oct. 4, 2019, 4:04
PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/political-commentary/ncaa-california-gavinnewsom-895160/.
36. Will Hobson, NCAA softens on allowing college athletes to be paid, but provides few
specifics, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2019, 12:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/ncaa-softens-public-stance-on-athlete-amateurism-providesfew-specifics/2019/10/29/4378b1f0-fa7a-11e9-8906-ab6b60de9124_story.html.
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A. Overview—The NCAA and Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics
The need to regulate intercollegiate athletics has existed for well
over a century and half.37 During the period of 1840 through 1910,
“there was a movement from loose student control of athletics to faculty
oversight . . . to the creation of conferences, and, ultimately, to the development of a national entity for governance purposes.”38 Some of the
impetus for this change emanated from university presidents; for example, Harvard’s President Eliot, was alarmed by the increasing commercialization of intercollegiate athletics.39 Similarly, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s President Walker, quipped that if the rate of
commercialization continued there would be a question about whether
“B.A. [stood] more for Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Athletics”–a quip
that still resonates today as a truthful depiction of intercollegiate athletics.40
In 1905, more than eighteen deaths and one hundred major injuries
in college football prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to invite officials from major football programs to the White House to resolve the
problem.41 This effort led to the creation of the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association (IAA) with sixty-two members, renamed in 1910 as the
NCAA, with the primary mission of formulating rules for various sports
to promote fair competition and amateurism.42

37. See Smith, supra note 4 (providing a rich and concise discussion about the NCAA’s
origins and other related developments while also offering some thoughts about the future).
Smith notes that “[o]ne of the earliest intercollegiate events” was a commercially sponsored
“highbrow [Yale-Harvard] regatta” in which Harvard sought an unfair advantage by using a
coxswain who was not a student. Id. at 10-11; see also RUSS VERSTEEG & JACK P. SAHL,
SPORTS LAW CASES & MATERIALS 353, 352-59 (4th ed. 2019) [hereinafter VERSTEEG &
SAHL] (providing a brief historical review of the NCAA).
38. Smith, supra note 4, at 12-13; see VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 353-54 (offering additional excerpts of Smith’s article, supra note 4).
39. Smith, supra note 4, at 11.
40. Id.
41. James v. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J.
9, 12 (1985); Smith, supra note 4, at 12.
42. Koch, supra note 41, at 12 (stating “[a]n additional concern of Roosevelt and others
was the preservation of amateurism.”); Smith, supra note 4, at 12; see United States v. Gatto,
295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Today, “[t]he NCAA is a non-profit organization
that regulates athletics for colleges and universities. NCAA member schools are organized
into three separate divisions: Divisions I, II, and III. Division I is the ‘highest level of intercollegiate athletics sanctioned by the NCAA.’ ” Id. “Schools with Division I athletics programs typically have the largest athletics budgets and offer the most athletic scholarships,
subject to NCAA regulations.” Id. Currently, Division I has 350 member schools. NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Aug. 22, 2020). In the
early 1950s, the NCAA “was transformed from a coordinating organization that was largely
confined to rulemaking and sponsoring championships, to one that had considerable financial
clout” because the NCAA was negotiating valuable television contacts for its members and
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Commercialism in intercollegiate sports continued to grow after
1910, causing the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Education to issue a report in 1929, calling for the diminishment of commercialism and for college presidents to “reclaim the integrity of the sport.”43
Despite the NCAA’s efforts to answer this call to reign in commercialism, it could not “keep pace with the growing commercialization of, and
interest in, intercollegiate athletics.”44 Some of this increase in commercialism was caused by sports fans’ widespread use of radio and television to follow college sports, World War II veterans returning and attending college in large numbers, and colleges adding or expanding
athletic programs.45 This period of commercial growth was emblematic
of a more global concern.
That concern is the perpetual clash between two fundamental forces
in the NCAA. One force involves the NCAA’s overriding commitment
to amateurism and its focus on the educational and cultural development
of student-athletes.46 The second, countervailing force entails the everincreasing commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and its corrosive effect on the principle of amateurism.47 The end result of this clash
has left the NCAA in a continuous search for a viably durable equilibrium between amateurism and commercialization in intercollegiate athletics.48
In an effort to “reclaim” or promote integrity in intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA in 1951 created the Committee on Infractions (COI)
with broad sanctioning authority to facilitate rule compliance.49 During
the 1950s and 1960s, the NCAA’s enforcement capacity increased annually, in part because of a strong executive director, Walter Byers,50
punishing them for rule violations, including severe financial penalties. See generally Koch,
supra note 41, at 13-14.
43. Smith, supra note 4, at 14; VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 354-55.
44. Smith, supra note 4, at 14.
45. Id. at 14-15.
46. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 2.5, 2.9.
47. Gurney, supra note 1, at 3-24.
48. See generally Kelly Charles Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for A New Tradition, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 181 (2017) (examining the amateurism tradition in college
sports from cultural and legal perspectives and contending it is a flawed cultural theme and
that the NCAA should abandon its amateurism theme and adopt a new tradition whereby student athletes can exploit their name, image and likeness and all athletes receive reasonable
compensation for their labors).
49. Smith, supra note 4, at 15.
50. Id.; Jack McCallum, IN THE KINGDOM OF THE SOLITARY MAN, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 6, 1986), https://www.si.com/vault/1986/10/06/8075446/in-the-kingdom-of-the-solitary-man-reticent-reclusive-walter-byers-the-executive-director-of-the-national-collegiate-athletic-association-will-retire-in-1988-but-as-byers-begins-to-relinquishhis-35-year-long-grip-on-the-ncaa-h.
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and due to additional revenue from lucrative contracts to broadcast intercollegiate sports.51 In the early 1970s, the NCAA also created divisions reflecting the competitive capacity of schools.52 By enacting this
change, the NCAA hoped to create a more balanced playing field among
competitors. During this time, enhanced rule enforcement by the NCAA
prompted criticism that its rules and enforcement were unfair.53 The
NCAA created a committee to study these criticisms and, in 1973,
adopted one of its key recommendations to divide the prosecutorial and
investigative roles of the COI.54
By 1976, the NCAA obtained new authority to enforce its rules by
penalizing schools directly, and thus indirectly penalizing the school’s
administrators, coaches, and student-athletes.55 Perhaps because of this
new authority, criticisms of the NCAA enforcement regime persisted
and in 1978, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigation conducted hearings regarding the fairness of
NCAA enforcement practices.56
Against a background of high profile intercollegiate scandals that
the New York Times concluded left a “stench in college sport,”57
51. Koch, supra note 41, at 13-14; Smith, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that the NCAA
negotiated its first million-dollar contract to televise intercollegiate football in the 1950s); see
also Branch, supra note 2 (“On June 6, 1952, NBC signed a one-year deal to pay the NCAA
$1.14 million for a carefully restricted football package.”); see generally Allen R. Sanderson
& John J. Siegfried, The Role of Broadcasting in National Collegiate Athletic Association
Sports, 52 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 305, 309-11 (Oct. 24, 2017) (describing the history of broadcast deals with the NCAA from 1921 to the present).
52. Smith, supra note 4, at 15.
53. David F. Gaona, The National Collegiate Athletic Association: Fundamental Fairness and the Enforcement Program, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1981) (recognizing that a
major criticism of the COI’s procedures and tactics was the unfairness of COI being involved
in the entire investigation and adjudication of a matter when the roles of investigator-prosecutor and adjudicator needed to be separate); Smith, supra note 4, at 15.
54. Gaona, supra note 53, at 1071-72 (acknowledging the NCAA unfused the COI’s
roles of being both an investigator-prosecutor and an adjudicator with the former function
now performed by a special investigative staff, and the adjudicator function still handled by
the COI; the NCAA Council functions as the NCAA’s appellate tribunal); Smith, supra note
4, at 15.
55. Smith, supra note 4, at 16.
56. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 356 (quoting Smith, supra note 4, at 16).
57. HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, CHANGING THE PLAYBOOK: HOW POWER, PROFIT, AND
POLITICS TRANSFORMED COLLEGE SPORTS 110 (Randy Roberts et al. eds. 2015) [hereinafter
CHUDACOFF]. Chapter 6 provides an interesting discussion of some of the NCAA’s most
prominent scandals ranging from improper payments to athletes (e.g., Southern Methodist
University (SMU) boosters “funneling secret payments to players” with at least the tacit support of SMU’s Board of Governors and the cooperation of its head football coach, ultimately
resulting in the NCAA’s “death penalty” sanction or cancelation of all of its football games
in 1987, id. at 105-06), to academic fraud (e.g., the PAC-10 Conference barred five members
from participating in the 1981 Rose Bowl because of academic fraud; one of those schools
was Arizona State, after eight football players passed a summer make-up mathematics course
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university and college presidents faced with declining enrollments paid
closer attention to intercollegiate athletics in the 1980s.58 Presidents
viewed athletic departments as an auxiliary unit with ever rising costs
but also as a potential to generate non-tuition based revenue and positive
publicity.59 The presidents also appreciated that their reputations and
jobs were increasingly tied to their athletic departments and intercollegiate athletics.60 Influential university trustees, alumni, faculty, and others pressured presidents to adopt policies and strategies to create successful intercollegiate sports programs.61 In 1984, the presidents formed
the President’s Commission and called a special convention in 1985, in
part to recommend rule changes with an eye to cost containment. The
President’s Commission produced mixed results.62
A little over a decade later, the presidents’ involvement grew to the
extent that they had changed the very governance structure of the
NCAA, with the addition of an Executive Committee and a Board of
Directors for the various divisions, both of which are made up of
presidents or chief executive officers.63

In 1991, the presidents helped create a blue ribbon committee called
the “Special Committee to Review the NCAA Enforcement and Infractions Process” (Special Committee)64 headed by President Rex E. Lee of
but never attended a class, id. at 111) and game cheating (e.g., the Tulane and Boston College
men’s basketball point-shaving schemes, the latter occurring in 1978-79 and involving mobster Henry Hill whose life became the subject of the 1990 movie Goodfellas, id. at 110).
58. Smith, supra note 4, at 16; see Sean Silverthorne, Diagnosing the ‘Flutie Effect’ on
College Marketing, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Apr. 29, 2013), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/diagnosing-the-flutie-effect-on-college-marketing.
59. Smith, supra note 4, at 16; see Silverthorne, supra note 58, at 53 (discussing the
Flutie Effect or the institutional impact of Doug Flutie on Boston College (BC) when he threw
a legendary, last second, “Hail Mary” pass to defeat the University of Miami in football, for
example, BC applications “shot up 30 percent” in the two years following the win; also reporting that in general, “[w]hen a school rises from mediocre to great on the gridiron, applications increase by 17.1 percent . . . schools become more academically selective with athletic
success,” and that “[w]inning programs prosper in diverse ways including ticket and product
sales, alumni donations, and TV contracts”).
60. Smith, supra note 4, at 16.
61. Id. This is largely still the case as evidenced by a remark from the new president of
the University of Akron, Dr. Gary Anderson, when asked about what he was going to do with
Akron’s football program. He emphatically replied, “[t]he quickest way for a president to get
fired is to either drop or add college football.” This statement was conveyed to the University
of Akron Law School faculty during a meeting with the president in 2019.
62. Smith, supra note 4, at 17 (“These efforts [at making rule changes in hopes of cost
containment] were not all successful.”); VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 331.
63. Smith, supra note 4, at 17.
64. This Commission was a response to the Supreme Court decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). In Tarkanian, the Court found that the NCAA was authorized
to conduct investigations and hearings, but as a private entity it is not subject to constitutional
due process requirements. Although not required to do so, the Tarkanian case caused the
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Brigham Young University with other prominent members such as former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger.65 The NCAA adopted some of the
Special Committee’s recommendations, for example, allowing the tape
recording of witness interviews and adding outside members to the
COI.66 Although the Special Committee’s efforts improved the NCAA
enforcement process, it nevertheless remained flawed as the NCAA “rejected the [Special Committee’s recommendation for] both an independent trier of fact and open hearings.”67 One critical assessment of the
NCAA’s rule enforcement process following the Special Committee’s
recommendations stated the following:
Given the persistent criticism and widespread agreement regarding
the NCAA’s flawed enforcement system, most would think it necessary to restore public confidence in this NCAA governance function.
Key among important changes for all cases with the potential of significant consequences should be the installation of discovery mechanisms and enhanced procedural protections for individuals and institutions.68

“In the late 1990s, the presidents became increasingly concerned
about student welfare” and enacted rules to protect student-athletes, for
example, by enacting the twenty-hour rule.69 This rule limited the
amount of time that coaches could ask student-athletes to practice and
compete in their sport to twenty hours per week in hopes of safeguarding
time for academic and other campus pursuits.70 Rule 2.9 of the Division
I Manual provides:
NCAA to appreciate some of the serious procedural flaws in its investigation and hearing
processes. GURNEY, supra note 1, at 99; see Smith, supra note 4, at 17; see generally Sahl,
supra note 1 (providing a detailed discussion of Tarkanian).
65. Smith, supra note 4, at 17-18.
66. Gurney, supra note 1, at 99.
67. Id. at 99-100.
68. Id. at 100.
69. MATHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & ROBERT C. BERRY,
SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 106 (2d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter MITTEN]. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 17.1.7.1 (limiting participation
in athletically related activities during the season to four hours per day and twenty hours per
week) (adopted Jan. 10, 1991) (effective Aug. 1, 1991).
70. MITTEN, supra note 69, at 107. The twenty-hour rule represented an important official step toward preserving adequate time for athletes to focus on their academic work and
cultural and social development. Unfortunately, the important benefits of this rule have been
undermined by unofficial demands for the athlete’s time; for example, “captain practices,”
voluntary practices led by team captains, and not so subtle encouragement to engage in related
off-season athletic activities, such as, playing soccer for a particular summer club. See Peter
Jacobs, Here’s The Insane Amount Of Time Student-Athletes Spend On Practice, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/college-student-athletes-spend-40-hours-a-week-practicing-2015-1 (reporting that NCAA Division I FBS football players on average practice forty-three and three tenths hours per week, men’s basketball
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Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived from such
pursuits. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.71

Similarly, Rule 2.2, titled “The Principle of Student Well-Being,”
states: “[i]ntercollegiate athletic programs shall be conducted in a manner designed to protect and enhance the physical and educational wellbeing of student-athletes.”72 The NCAA’s twenty-hour rule, like the requirement that “[d]uring the playing season, all countable athletically
related activities . . . shall be prohibited during one calendar day per
week,” prohibition on hiring agents were designed to promote, amateurism by enhancing the amateur athlete’s student interests or educational
and cultural enrichment.73
The NCAA period from 1980 through 2000 has been described as
“active” with a “meteoric rise” in both revenue74 and the commercialization of intercollegiate sports.75 This rise occurred at a time when college presidents were still grappling with the increasing costs of higher
education, including expenses associated with the “arms race” or the expansion of athletic facilities and staff, declining enrollment, and daunting budgetary constraints because of an economic downturn.76
By 2000, college presidents consolidated their power within the
NCAA.77 They launched a major academic reform effort to increase the
averages thirty-nine and two tenths hours of practice per week, and Division I Women’s Basketball practices roughly thirty-seven and sixth tenths hours per week).
71. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.9. The Principle of Sound Academic Standards
is another provision emphasizing the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism and education.
Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the
educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student
body. The admission, academic standing and academic progress of student-athletes
shall be consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the
student body in general.
Id. § 2.5.
72. Id. § 2.2.
73. Id. § 17.1.7.4 (Requiring Day Off—Playing Season) (adopted Jan. 10, 1991) (effective Aug. 1, 1991). For other rules during this period that were intended to promote amateurism and student-athlete interests and educational enrichment see e.g., id. § 17.1.7.10.2 (No
Class Time Missed for Practice Activities) (adopted Jan. 10, 1991) (effective Aug. 1, 1991).
74. MITTEN, supra note 69, at 107. For example, the NCAA and CBS agreed to a $1.725
billion, eight-year television contract for the rights to Division I Men’s Basketball games—
commonly referred to as March Madness. Id. at 106. This influx of money helped the NCAA
expand and increase its support for Division I members. Id.
75. Id. at 107.
76. Id. at 106-07.
77. Id. at 107.
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academic progress and graduation rates of student-athletes, especially in
the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball, where
graduation rates were dismal and generated much criticism.78 Amid festering criticism about the NCAA’s failure to ensure that intercollegiate
athletes received a meaningful education leading to graduation, the
NCAA created the Annual Academic Progress Rate (AAPR) in 2003
which generates a real-time assessment of team academic performance.79
The AAPR requires student-athletes to declare a major and to complete
a minimum number of credits per semester toward earning a degree
while maintaining a minimum grade point average.80 The AAPR enhanced institutional accountability for ensuring student-athletes met
NCAA academic progress and graduation rate benchmarks, in part, by
providing incentives and disincentives, for example, the loss of athletic
scholarships.81 Nevertheless, some critics contend that academic cheating still continues as schools have found new and more sophisticated
ways to avoid AAPR penalties.82
In 2020, the intercollegiate athletics’ landscape is still being shaped
by the ever-growing forces of commercialism and the increasing power
of big, elite football and basketball programs to drive intercollegiate regulatory policy while lesser situated athletic programs struggle to keep
up.83 This development was underscored in August 2014 when the
“NCAA Board of Directors (now called the Board of Governors) granted
legislative autonomy to the five wealthiest conferences in the Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS) representing sixty-five institutions and adopted
a new governance structure to provide greater operational control to athletic directors and conference representatives.”84 The president of Boise
State University characterized the autonomy legislation as a “ ‘ power
78. Id. at 105, 107.
79. Division I Academic Progress Rate (APR), NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/division-i-academic-progress-rate-apr (last visited Sep. 25, 2020).
80. MITTEN, supra note 69, at 107, 137.
81. Id. at 107-08 (reporting that the creation of amateurism clearinghouse legislation by
the NCAA Division I and II Management Councils to deal with amateurism issues related to
prospective domestic and international athletes and the AARP “are bearing some fruit, in
terms of increased academic progress . . . with the implementation of sanctions related to academic progress reporting.”).
82. GURNEY, supra note 1, at 39 (citing Brad Wolverton, Confessions of a Fixer, CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/confessions-of-afixer/) (describing a “vast scheme of cheating among, elite revenue-generating football and
basketball athletes and coaches” where an “aspiring basketball coach took online classes at
Brigham Young University and Adams State University for hundreds of elite athletes needing
. . . course credit hours and grades for initial and continuing eligibility[;]” and “uncover[ing]
a similar scheme for basketball players at the University of Texas.”).
83. See id. at 18-19.
84. Id. at 18.
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grab’ that facilitated the NCAA’s attempt to perpetuate the dominance
of a few dozen universities with the most resources to pull the strings.”85
University and college presidents emphasized their need to retain control
of athletics in order for this new governance model to work, although the
validity of that assertion remains unproven.86 “In January 2015 the
NCAA formally adopted super-conference autonomy in governance [as
the] presidents from the five wealthiest conferences, known as the Power
Five . . . reasoned that modern big-time sport was its own-ecosystem,
and its issues and the ability to resolve them were unique to their institutions.”87
Today and throughout the NCAA’s long and colorful history, no
matter the development, travail, or success, a key NCAA hallmark is that
student-athletes must be amateurs rather than professionals.88 The
NCAA is committed to maintaining a line of demarcation between amateur and professional or commercial athletic activity. NCAA rules
clearly prohibit certain activity as professional and crossing that demarcation line results in exclusion of the student-athlete from any further
participation in intercollegiate sports. For example, one clear prohibition and the focus of this article concerns student-athlete use of agents.
“Student-athletes, prospective student-athletes, and their relatives are
prohibited from accepting any benefits, including money, travel, clothing, or other merchandise, directly or indirectly from a financial advisor
or an agent.”89 The term agent “is defined broadly to include anyone
‘who, directly or indirectly . . . seeks to obtain any type of financial gain
or benefit . . . from a student-athlete’s potential earnings as a professional athlete.’ ” 90 The NCAA first adopted the No Agent Rule in 1974,
in part to promote the principle of amateurism and to maintain the line
of demarcation between amateur and professional sports.91
85. Id. at 18-19. The Boise State University President further declared: “It seems they
[the big elite programs] are never satisfied with their bloated athletic budgets, especially when
threatened in recent years by upstart, so-called mid-major programs that steal recruits, oftentimes beat the big-boys, ‘mess with’ the national rankings and sometimes take postseason
bowl games and revenue.” Id.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id. at 19.
88. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3 (Article I of the NCAA Constitution highlights
the NCAA’s longstanding “basic purpose” to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by
so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.”) (emphasis added).
89. Id. § 12.3.2; see United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
90. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.02.1.
91. See id. § 12.3.1 (“An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she has ever agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for
the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an
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It is not always clear what kind of student-athlete conduct crosses
the amateur-professional demarcation line. For example, Part V of this
article argues that the NCAA should permit student-athletes to retain
sports agents and that such retention does not automatically and magically transform an amateur student-athlete’s efforts into professional
work.92 It is worth noting that other amateur sports organizations do not
share the NCAA’s belief that its commitment to amateurism requires a
No Agent Rule.93 For example, the United States Golf Association’s
Rules of Amateur Golf permits amateur members to hire agents and earn
compensation unrelated to winning a tournament.94 Nevertheless, the
NCAA’s longstanding No Agent Rule has continued largely undisturbed
for decades, even with the myriad of developments and changes, such as
the O’Bannon decision, impacting the NCAA. That period of non-disturbance changed with the Rice Commission’s recommendation in 2018
that elite Division I Men’s Basketball players be entitled to agents.95
III. SPORTS AGENTS
It is important to understand the special role that sports agents play
in their client-athletes’ personal and professional lives before attempting
to regulate agent conduct. The agent’s role in helping an athlete succeed
agency contract not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall be
deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible to participate in any
sport.”); see David Wade, Inside the Rules: the NCAA “No Agent” Rule, HARDBALL TIMES
(Feb. 8, 2011), https://tht.fangraphs.com/inside-the-rules-ncaa-no-agent-rule/ (explaining that
the rule was enacted in 1974 when the NCAA conceded to allow players to seek professional
advice, but prohibited advisors from negotiating directly with professional teams).
92. See infra Part V.
93. See GURNEY, supra note 1, at 15 (“The NCAA has modified rules in ways that have
little to do with the core notion of amateurism (that is, not being paid to play a sport) and are
inconsistent with those of other amateur organizations.”).
94. Id. The Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) permits payments to its athletes during training or competition periods to cover their lost earnings during this time; they can also receive
endorsement income. Id. The NCAA’s effort to protect amateurism creates some curious results; European tennis players can earn up to $10,000 for playing tennis during high school
and still be eligible for NCAA tennis whereas a similarly situated United States player would
not be eligible. Id. at 15–16. A rule like this treating European players differently seems arbitrary on its face and could lead some to criticize the NCAA rules as unfair.
95. On August 8, 2018, the NCAA adopted the Rice Commission’s recommendation that
elite Division I Men’s Basketball players be permitted to retain an agent’s services. NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 12.02.1.2, 12.3.1.2.2. This exception to the NCAA’s No Agent
Rule is accompanied by a related NCAA agent certification process. See ECAG, supra note
31, at 6-8. This process became operational in August 2019 and has raised some concerns, in
part, about it imposing “overly burdensome prerequisites” for NCAA agent certification and
having a “procedurally flawed” and an unfair enforcement scheme. See Marc Edelman &
Richard Karcher, The NCAA’s Agent Certification Program: A Critical Legal Analysis, 11
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 155, 162, 167-69, 182 (2020); see infra Part IV for a discussion
of the Rice Commission.
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is multifaceted and demanding—a 24/7 job. The athlete’s first call is
often to his or her agent for help with important and even minor athleticsrelated and other personal needs. The agent-athlete relationship is very
personal and built upon trust, support, and communication—similar to
the fiduciary relationship that lawyers have with clients. Agents need to
be accessible for their athlete-clients or risk losing them, given the intense competition among agents for athletes.96
A. The Role of Sports Agents
“Historically, the agent’s role primarily involved negotiating the
athlete’s performance contract with a team or a sponsor of an event, such
as a tennis tournament.”97 While sports agents still perform this task,
“agents today are often expected to provide additional services, such as
financial, tax, and estate planning, public relations, travel assistance,”
career counseling, “and security, or find others who can provide such
services.”98
Large talent agencies, like IMG and Creative Artists Agency, offer
clients “one-stop shopping” convenience where generally all of the talent’s service needs are provided in-house by the large agency.99 Individual agents and smaller agencies commonly assemble a team of

96. See Bob Nightengale, Albert Pujols, agent wary of rivals aiming to land star, USA
TODAY, http://usatoday.com/sports/baseball/story/2011-09-22/Dan-Lazono-Albert-PujolsScott-Boras/50522204/1 (last updated Sept. 23, 2011, 12:39 PM) (noting the efforts of other
agents to lure agent Dan Lozano’s all-star baseball player-client, Albert Pujols, by criticizing
Lozano and prompting one agent to state, “[u]nfortunately for our business, it’s typical . . .
It’s not pretty.”).
97. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 392; see Lionel S. Sobel, The Regulation of
Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 701, 705-06 (1987).
98. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 392; W. Jack Grosse & Eric Warren, The Regulation, Control, and Protection of Athletic Agents, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 53 (1991); Our
Services, WILLIS SPORTS AGENTS, https://www.willissports.com/our-services/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2020).
99. There has been notable consolidation in the agency field. For example, in 2009 the
William Morris Agency and Endeavor merged to form WME—the biggest talent agency merger ever. Our Story, ENDEAVOR, http://endeavorco.com/story/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2020). In
2014, WME (William Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC) acquired IMG, the first, large
international sports agency in the United States created by Mark McCormack in 1960 and
based in Cleveland, Ohio. Id.; Frank Litsky, Mark H. McCormack, 72, Pioneer of Sports Marketing, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/17/sports/mark-hmccormack-72-pioneer-of-sports-marketing.html; The tragedy of Mark McCormack and
IMG, CMG PARTNERS (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.cmgpartners.ca/mccormack-family (asserting that McCormack “created the industry of sports marketing”). The combined entity was
renamed Endeavor in 2017. Our Story, IMG, http://img.com/story/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2020)
(“[IMG] is one of the largest independent producers and distributors of sports media” and
“specializes in sports training, league development; and marketing, media and licensing for
brands, sports organizations and collegiate institutions.”).
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outside advisors to assist in servicing some of the athlete’s diverse
needs.100 These advisors work closely with the agent. In this scenario,
the agent functions like the head of an operations control room, managing the various advisors’ efforts on behalf of the athlete.101
The agent’s role for an athlete is largely determined by the agency
contract. It is important for the agent to know what kind of support the
client-athlete needs or expects. Those needs should be noted in the
agency contract.102 The contract may be broadly worded to include a
number of functions, all of which entitle the agent to charge a commission.103
One of the agent’s first responsibilities is negotiating an employment contract between the athlete and the party (e.g., sports franchise)
purchasing the athlete’s services. Agents must understand the athlete’s
sports industry and the financial status of the prospective purchaser to
effectively negotiate favorable terms in the athlete’s employment contract. The agent needs to build a case for the athlete’s value, for example,
by noting coaching and scouting recommendations, prior athletic accomplishments (e.g., scoring records and other honors), and physical evaluations (e.g., agility and speed).104 The agent compares his client’s talents
and accomplishments with similar benchmarks for current and former
athletes in the industry to gauge the client’s fair market value.105 In some
sports, such as basketball and football, the agent’s work will be influenced by overarching collective bargaining agreements negotiated between player associations and team owners, such as in basketball and
football.106 These agreements will guide the agent’s work and require
100. One example of a successful smaller agency was ICON Management, in Stow, Ohio
that represented golfers and other talent. International Management Group (IMG) ultimately
acquired ICON reflecting a common scenario where larger firms expand their market presence
by acquisitions and/or consolidations. See Icon Sports Management, PITCHBOOK,
https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/109234-45 (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
101. Grosse & Warren, supra note 98, at 53 (noting agents will retain oversight of other
personnel delivering services to their client, the talent or athlete).
102. For example, Article III of the Uniform Sports Agents Act (USAA) would require
agency contracts with student athletes to specify the services to be provided. Phillip N. Fluhr,
Jr., The Regulation of Sports Agents and the Quest for Uniformity, 6 SPORTS L. J. 1, 17 (1999).
103. Grosse & Warren, supra note 98, at 53.
104. Sobel, supra note 97, at 705-06.
105. Id. at 706 (“Player agents also perform another function in negotiations—one that
requires the sort of knowledge usually possessed by professionals, but not by most athletes.
In order to properly negotiate player contracts today, it is necessary to be familiar with the
details of collective bargaining agreements and to have knowledge of the salaries that have
been paid to comparable players. Acquiring this knowledge is not prohibitively difficult, but
it does require some effort and a legal, financial or business background certainly helps.”).
106. Id. at 706-07. See also NFLPA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (2020),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFLNFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf.
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that certain league-wide minimum terms be part of the athlete’s contract.
For example, collective bargaining agreements determine the date of free
agency, the wearing of team athletic apparel, and the agent’s rate of commission.107
Successful agents help their client-athletes obtain product and service endorsement deals to augment their player income. For example,
tennis great, Andre Agassi, appeared in Canon camera television commercials in the late 1980s and early 1990s,108 as did Tiger Woods in
Buick commercials.109 More recently, LeBron James earned $90 million
for his product endorsement deal with Nike.110 Although these megadeals attract widespread attention, finding endorsement or licensing
deals for non-star athletes is challenging. Agents may struggle with this
task even in local markets.
Endorsement deals are important for most athletes, not only for the
money but also for the exposure. Agents might ask the athlete’s team or
event provider with a larger market presence for help in acquiring a licensing deal when negotiating a player’s team or event contract. “Some
licensing deals require athletes to use a particular sports product, for example, a golf club or tennis racket, during competition.”111 Some athletes need the agent to handle all of the athlete’s business matters, ranging from scheduling appointments to handling all financial obligations
(e.g., collecting, depositing, and investing earnings and paying transportation and other expenses). The line between managing business and
personal affairs is not always clear; for example, an agent may help find
a personal residence and then negotiate its purchase. Some athletes prefer their agent to play a greater role in managing the athletes’ personal
107. See, e.g., MLBPA, 2017-2021 BASIC AGREEMENT (2017), https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/Basic%20Agreement_english.pdf (declaring free agency starts at 9:00
a.m. on the day following the last world series game, and that players can wear only clubissued apparel during games).
108. See Steve Tignor, 1989: IMAGE IS EVERTHING—ANDRE AGASSI’S INFAMOUS
AD, TENNIS.COM (Aug. 30, 2015), https://www.tennis.com/pro-game/2015/08/image-everything-andre-agassis-infamous-ad/55425/; Stuart Elliot, THE MEDIA BUSINESS: Advertising;
The Governing Body of Tennis Tries to Polish its Image., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1993),
https://www.tennis.com/pro-game/2015/08/image-everything-andre-agassis-infamousad/55425/.
109. Laura Petrecca, GM ends 9-Year endorsement relationship with Tiger Woods, ABC
NEWS
(Nov.
25,
2008,
6:48
AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=6329219&page=1.
110. Kurt Badenhausen, LeBron James Is The NBA’s Leading Shoe Salesman, FORBES
(May 22, 2013, 11:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/05/22/lebron-james-is-the-nbas-leading-shoe-salesmen/#6906efa689d.
111. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 393 (“An agent should negotiate an ‘escape
clause’ permitting the athlete to switch to a different product if it is negatively affecting the
athlete’s performance.”).
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affairs (e.g., paying for mortgages, medical insurance), freeing the athletes to focus on their sports careers.112 As fiduciaries, individual agents
and small agencies are often responsible for assembling a team of experts
and advisors to manage the athlete’s long-term business and personal
welfare, including the athlete’s plans for a post-sports career.113
Many athletes’ careers last only a few years. For example, an NFL
player’s average career length is three and one-third seasons.114 Agents
need to assist the athletes in developing a financial plan to provide for
the athlete’s long-term welfare. Agents often hire investment advisors
and accountants to help with this function.115 The landscape of sports
stories is replete with athletes who earned large sums of money only to
end up destitute. For example, one article reported that after two years
of retirement, seventy-eight percent of former NFL players were bankrupt or under financial stress, and sixty percent of former NBA players
were in a similar situation five years after retirement.116
An overlooked, but important agent function involves developing
and marketing the athlete’s public image. Agents may connect athletes
to charitable and other public events and causes that not only provide
intrinsic rewards for the athlete but also may enhance the athlete’s market value.117 Effective agents directly cultivate relationships with sports
writers and other media personnel (e.g., television interviews) to cover
112. See Sobel, supra note 97, at 708.
113. See id. at 704-05 (discussing the increasing complexity of financial matters for athletes).
114. Christina Gough, Average playing career length in the National Football League,
STATISTA (Sep. 10, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/240102/average-player-careerlength-in-the-national-football-league/; see SI WIRE, WSJ data analysis shows average
length of NFL careers decreasing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2016/03/01/nfl-careers-shortened-two-years-data-analysis
(noting
that “the average NFL career length was just 2.66 years” and concussions and health risks are
a major reason why players walk away from the career); see also NFL PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION, www.NFLplayers.com/about-us/FAOS/NFL-Hopeful-FAQs/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2020) (showing the average length of a football player’s career in 2014 to be three
and a half seasons). The average length of a football player’s career seems to have declined at
least slightly since 2014 which underscores the need for the agent and student-athlete to engage in financial planning as soon as possible in college. Once the student athlete signs a
player contract with an NFL team, that player’s agent must be registered and fully compliant
with the players union, the NFLPA, rules governing agents.
115. See Grosse & Warren, supra note 98, at 53; Sobel, supra note 97, at 709.
116. Pablo S. Torre, HOW (AND WHY) ATHLETES GO BROKE, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
VAULT (Mar. 23, 2009), https://vault.si.com/vault/2009/03/23/how-and-why-athletes-gobroke.
117. See, e.g., Community Relations, KMG SPORTS SERVS., https://www.kmgsports.com/services/#tab-id-5 (last visited Aug. 18, 2020) (describing charitable activities the
agency is prepared to assist its clients with); General Services, KMG SPORTS SERVS.,
https://www.kmgsports.com/services/#tab-id-1 (last visited Aug. 18, 2020) (“Our job is to
build your brand and maximize your revenue.”).

24

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.61

the athlete118 or hire public relations firms for the same purpose. These
firms are especially important in helping to rehabilitate an athlete’s image that has suffered harm because of the athlete’s questionable conduct.119
B. Regulating Sports Agents: The Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA)
and Similar Rules
Sports agents have been associated with a variety of scandals ranging from improper recruitment of athletes for a particular college, as in
Gatto,120 to stealing from client athletes.121 The concern about rogue
agent misconduct is cited as a primary justification for the NCAA’s NoAgent Rule as well as for state and federal regulatory efforts.122 There
is a general legislative consensus that sports agents require regulation.123

118. Mike Florio, Good agents do a lot more than negotiate contracts, NBC SPORTS: PRO
FOOTBALL
TALK
(July
23,
2015,
11:01
AM),
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/07/23/good-agents-do-a-lot-more-than-negotiate-contracts/ (“Good
agents have relationships in the media . . . .”).
119. See, e.g., Gene Wojciechowski, Fleischer PR won’t rebuild Tiger’s image, ESPN
(Mar. 11, 2010), sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?id=4986830 (Tiger Woods hired
former President George W. Bush’s Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, to handle the adverse publicity stemming, in part, from Woods’ extramarital conduct).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (ensuring high
school basketball players would attend and play for the universities by paying high bribes);
see infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of Gatto.
121. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS
AGENTS 72-87 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS] (providing a good discussion
of well-known criminal and civil cases of misconduct against sports agents). The authors described the landscape of agent misconduct in the following sentences:
At the extremes, agent misconduct and malfeasance, ranging from mismanagement
to misappropriation of athlete client’s assets to disparagement of other agents in
order to gain a competitive advantage, fuel perceptions of an industry composed of
individuals too willing to compromise ethics and competent representation for financial gain. Agent impropriety overlaps with the reality of largely newly or prospectively rich individuals not receiving the counseling they require to duplicate the
success on the field with success off the field.
Id. at 1-2. The authors also stated that “no matter the concerns that lie at the center of the
sports agent storm, it is a business that captures the attention of many.” Id. at 1.
122. See Myers, supra note 29 (discussing the global importance of and related concerns
about sports, the need to protect the integrity of sports from corruption, and state and federal
laws that would effectively fight corruption in Division I basketball). This author contends
that sports agents have “facilitated much of the corruption in college sports.” Id. at 75.
123. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS
713 (6th ed. 2019) [hereinafter WEILER] (offering a scholarly treatment of state and federal
regulation. California was the first state to get into the business of regulating sports agents in
1982 when it promulgated the California Athlete Agents Act, id. at 710-14). See also ROBERT
H. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE’S GUIDE TO AGENTS 107 (5th ed. 2010) (confirming that California
was the first state to enact a mandatory athlete-agent regulatory scheme in 1981 and noting
that two years later NFLPA instituted a plan to protect football players).
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By the 1990s, twenty-eight states had created a patchwork of laws
regulating sports agents.124 Most of them imposed a registration requirement.125 The laws were largely ineffective as few agents registered, and
even more unsettling from a regulatory perspective, few states devoted
sufficient resources for adequate enforcement.126
In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) created the Uniform Athlete Agents Acts
(UAAA).127 By 2018, forty-three states had adopted some version of the
UAAA.128 The UAAA’s primary purposes are the protection of studentathletes, who may lose their NCAA eligibility by being contacted prematurely by agents or improperly agreeing to sports representation, and
the protection of universities, which may lose their time and financial
investment in recruiting athletes and granting athletic scholarships.129
On the federal level, the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
(SPARTA) was enacted in 2004.130 SPARTA prohibits almost the same
conduct as the UAAA and uses the same definition of “athlete-agent.”131
Unlike the UAAA, SPARTA treats violations as unfair trade practices,
which may be prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or

124. See WEILER, supra note 123, at 710-11.
125. See id. at 711.
126. Id.
127. See REVISED UNIF. AGENTS ACT (2015) [hereinafter RUAAA] (noting that the
NCCUSL and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) designations are interchangeable as they
refer to the same organization and that as of 2020 the NCCUSL was in its 128th year. The
NCCUSL is comprised of legal experts from the academy and profession with goal of creating
non-partisan legislation to clarify existing law and to create national uniform legal standards).
128. WEILER, supra note 123, at 711; SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 158 (“A
clear majority of the states that have adopted the UAAA have done so without making any
substantively significant variations to it.”).
129. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 158 (“Early on, the focus of uniform legislation was on issues relating to recruitment, not agent quality control.”); WEILER supra note
123, at 711-12. See Myers, supra note 29, at 75-76; see also Joshua Lens, Application of the
UAAA, RUAAA, and State Athlete-Agent Laws to Corruption in Men’s College Basketball and
Revisions Necessitated by NCAA Rule Changes, 30 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 47, 64 (2019).
130. Michael L. Martin, It’s Not a Foul Unless the Ref Blows the Whistle: How to Step
Up Enforcement of the UAAA and SPARTA, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 209, 214 (2012).
131. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. § 7801(2) (2004)
(defining “athlete-agent” as “an individual who enters into an agency contract with a student
athlete, or directly or indirectly recruits or solicits a student athlete to enter into an agency
contract, and does not include a spouse, parent, sibling, grandparent, or guardian of such student athlete, or an individual acting solely on behalf of a professional sports team or professional sports organization”); UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 2(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000)
(The 2000 UAAA’s definition was materially identical); RUAAA, supra note 127, § 2(2) (expanding this definition to include financial advisors and others.); see also Myers, supra note
29, at 77.
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state attorneys general.132 By 2012, the UAAA and SPARTA laws were
rarely enforced despite continued agent misconduct.133
In the following years, several states amended their athlete-agent
acts to address perceived weaknesses and under-enforcement.134 The
NCCUSL introduced the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act
(RUAAA) in 2015 to preserve uniformity and modernize the UAAA. As
of 2019, fourteen states had enacted the RUAAA, and nine more introduced it.135 The RUAAA is widely supported by collegiate athletic officials and coaches, as well as several prominent agents.136
Like the UAAA, the RUAAA’s central focus is the “protection [of]
student-athletes and educational institutions” who may suffer harm when
an athlete agrees to agent representation and, as a result, loses his or her
eligibility before it has expired.137 The RUAAA attempts to promote the
protection of student-athletes in several ways. First, the RUAAA created
a simplified and uniform agent registration process and also added a goal
of promoting information-sharing among state agent registration bodies.138 Agents must register with the state, providing references and disclosing their formal training to be an agent, their practical experiences
as an agent, and their education.139 The applicant must also disclose
criminal convictions involving acts of moral turpitude and felonies, civil
determinations of false or deceptive representations, applicant conduct
that led to the imposition of sanctions on a student-athlete, and any disciplinary action against the agent.140
Under the RUAAA, agents are prohibited from contacting studentathletes unless the agents are registered and, as a way of promoting compliance with the RUAAA, agent registration in one state entitles that
agent to reciprocity in any other RUAAA state.141 Agent representation
132. Martin, supra note 130, at 214-15. See Myers, supra note 29, at 86 (proposing a “dual
threat”—that individual institutions have standing to bring suit against bad agents along with
the FTC for violating SPARTA, shifting some of the burden from the FTC while still allowing
it to file an unfair trade practice claim; the NCAA would first file a claim with the FTC and if
it elected not to pursue an unfair trade practice claim, then the NCAA could file suit).
133. See Martin, supra note 130, at 215.
134. Lens, supra note 129, at 65.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 65-66.
137. REVISED UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) [hereinafter
RUAAA 2019]; see SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS supra note 121, at 159-62.
138. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 2-3; see also WEILER, supra note 123, at 711-12
(“[Under the RUAAA,] agents must register with the state and disclose training, experience,
. . . and any disciplinary action against the agent. . . and [t]he agent and/or student must notify
the educational institution within 72 hours that a representation agreement has been signed.”).
139. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 159; WEILER, supra note 123, at 712.
140. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 160; WEILER, supra note 123, at 712.
141. WEILER, supra note 123, at 712.
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agreements must be in writing, signed by both parties, with clear provisions specifying compensation and the agent’s registration status.142 The
RUAAA also broadens the definition of “athlete agent” to include financial and career advisors,143 requires student-athletes to sign a statement
acknowledging that they may lose their amateur eligibility by entering
into an agency contract, and provides the athlete with a fourteen day cancellation period.144 Agents cannot offer anything of value to the athlete
in exchange for signing a representation agreement, and the “agent
and/or the athlete must notify the educational institution within seventytwo hours of the signing of a representation agreement.”145 The RUAAA
gives student-athletes a right of action against agents who violate the act
and provides criminal penalties for agents who encourage another to take
action, which the act would prohibit the agent from taking.146
The NCCUSL amended Section 14 of the RUAAA in 2019 to accommodate the NCAA’s 2018 bylaw amendments implementing the
Rice Commission’s recommendation that basketball players who declare
for the NBA draft, but who are not drafted, should be able to return to
college, finish their degree, and remain eligible for college basketball.147
In addition, while the 2015 version of the RUAAA flatly prohibited an
agent from “furnish[ing] anything of value to the athlete before the athlete enters into [a sports agent] contract,”148 the 2019 RUAAA version
permits it where the agent notifies the athletic director of the athlete’s
institution and the athlete makes a recorded acknowledgment that receiving the “thing of value” may result in loss of the athlete’s eligibility.149
The apparent purpose of this 2019 RUAAA amendment, consistent with
2018 changes to the NCAA bylaws, is to allow agents to defray expenses
related to the agent selection process even before the athlete has signed
an agreement with the agent.150
The various governmental regulatory regimes governing sports
agents, such as SPARTA, are broad and comprehensive. Although there
142. Id.
143. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 2.
144. WEILER, supra note 123, at 712.
145. Id.
146. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 2-3.
147. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.2.4.2.1; RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 1-3.
148. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, § 14(2).
149. Id. § 14.
150. See id. §§ 14 cmt., 14(2); see also RUAAA, supra note 127, at 2-3 (explaining that
NCAA bylaws amendments adopted August 8, 2018, “allowed for payments by sports agents
to student-athletes and family members for meals, hotel, and travel in connection with recruiting and signing the student-athlete as a client.”). Unlike the NCAA Bylaw, the RUAAA
amendment on its face interestingly does not limit the payment of expenses to only the agent
selection process.
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is literature suggesting ways to improve these regimes,151 one might
think nevertheless that the broad scope of these laws ensures adequate
protection for student-athletes from agent misconduct, especially when
considered in conjunction with the NCAA’s No Agent Rule.152 Unfortunately, widespread under-enforcement of state and federal laws, and
NCAA regulations, means that student-athletes are still vulnerable to
agent misconduct. “Only a handful of UAAA criminal cases have been
brought under the UAAA.”153 An Associated Press study in 2010
showed “that more than half of the 42 states that had enacted a version
of the UAAA had failed . . . [to] impose any penalty on a sports agent,”
let alone suspend or revoke an agent’s registration or license.154 The
under-enforcement of existing agent laws may lead to broader disrespect
and even encourage agents to violate other laws and rules.155 A regulatory regime’s effectiveness in punishing and deterring misconduct, no
matter how well-crafted, is fatally undermined without a serious and active commitment to regulatory enforcement and adequate or better

151. Jessop, supra note 29 (noting the inadequacy of the UAAA, SPARTA and the NCAA
Division I Manual’s rules to protect student athletes’ interests from sports agents given the
Gatto scandal and recommending a new model whereby “NCAA Division I FBS member
institutions . . . each adopt and actively impose individual sports agent regulations[;]” educate
NCAA athletes about the “role and requirements of sports agents[;]” and offer “member institutional-based incentives to sports agents” in return for agent compliance); Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and State Efforts Do Not Deter the
Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing System May Cure the Problem,
78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225, 1233-53 (2004) (calling for a national registry and the licensure
of sports agents and arguing that the threat of license revocation would deter agent misconduct); Timothy G. Nelson, Flag on the Play: The Ineffectiveness of Athlete-Agent Law and
Regulations—and How North Carolina Can Take Advantage of a Scandal to Be a Model for
Reform, 90 N.C.L. REV. 800, 820-21 (2012) (“Despite the multiple means by which agents are
regulated, the current regulatory scheme is general ineffective at preventing and deterring athlete agents from engaging in improper behavior. The laws are rarely enforced, and when they
are, punishments fail to adequately penalize violators enough to deter others from committing
future violations.”).
152. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.1.2(g), which essentially bars an athlete
from entering into an agent services agreement; and see also id. § 12.1.2(a)-(b), which also
bars an athlete from receiving compensation or accepting a promise of payment related to
athletic skill from an agent.
153. WEILER supra note 123, at 713.
154. Id.
155. See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV.
971, 1006 (2002) (expressing a similar concern about underenforced advertising rules in the
legal profession an d concluding that this “breeds disrespect for professional regulation . . .
[and] may encourage lawyers to violate or bend other professional rules.”); RICE REPORT,
supra note 14, at 2 (“Where an entire community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the
governance body fails to act, the result is cynicism and contempt; and noting that all [NCAA
stakeholders] expressed the belief that the current [infractions investigation and adjudication]
system is not working in cases of serious violations.”).
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resources devoted to such enforcement.156 Both of these conditions for
effective regulatory enforcement seem to be lacking given the dismal
enforcement record against bad agents under RUAAA-based state laws
and SPARTA. Until there is effective enforcement of sports agent laws,
student-athletes and NCAA member institutions will continue to be at
risk of being harmed by agent misconduct, as poignantly illustrated in
the recent case of United States v. Gatto.157
IV. UNITED STATES V. GATTO AND THE RICE COMMISSION
United States v. Gatto is a case about corruption in NCAA Division
I Men’s College Basketball, a billion-dollar enterprise for the NCAA,
prominent colleges and universities, and their coaches.158 In 2017 the
University of Louisville’s team realized $29 million in revenue from
men’s basketball alone.159 The Gatto case has been described as “[o]ne
of the biggest stories in college sports . . . turn[ing] the men’s college
basketball world upside down” because it detailed “a thriving black market in which coaches, agents, financial advisors, and shoe and apparel
company employees exploited naïve, young basketball student-athletes.”160
The trial judge in Gatto noted that “[a]t the root of this situation is
the NCAA’s principle of amateurism”161—a principle that has attracted
much criticism.162 Under the NCAA’s rules, only amateurs can compete
156. ELIOT
FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL
POWERS:
A
STUDY
OF
THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 187 (1986) (noting that the regulation of
other occupations, for example, the law profession, have experienced a similar dynamic where
inadequate resources and/or the will to enforce an otherwise good regulatory scheme will fail
to punish and deter future misconduct).
157. United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019). For prior history, see United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336,
339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss a conspiracy indictment
“among defendants, certain basketball coaches of the Universities of Louisville and Miami,
and certain student basketball players and/or their families.”).
158. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *1-2.
159. Id. at *2; see James F. Reid, Call to the Bullpen: How the 2012 MLB Draft Shows
Why the NCAA Must Make a Change to its Bylaws, 3 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 57, 78-79
(2012) (noting that college sports is a $60 billion industry and that the NCAA received $711
million for the 2011 television rights to the March Madness basketball tournament).
160. See Lens, supra note 129, at 50.
161. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *1-2 (reporting the court’s reasoning for partially granting and partially denying the government’s motion to exclude the defendants’ expert testimony).
162. Id. at 3 (characterizing the NCAA’s amateurism rules as “long standing, [but] not
free of controversy” and noting that “[s]ome have argued that [the amateurism rules] unfairly
prevent student-athletes from sharing in the financial benefits generated by the basketball
games they play.”); see, e.g., Reid, supra note 159 (discussing changes to the MLB’s 2012
Draft rules that make it difficult for high school and college baseball student-athletes to assess
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in intercollegiate athletics, and the difference between an amateur and a
professional athlete is the receipt of a benefit or payment related to one’s
athletic services.163 The student-athlete forfeits amateur eligibility if he
or she accepts any form of payment directly or indirectly related to collegiate athletics that is not approved by the NCAA.164 In addition, any
university or individual, such as a coach, found to have violated an
NCAA rule “may be subject [to additional penalties], including limitation on the school’s participation in post-season play . . . , limitations on
the school’s funding from the NCAA, and various financial penalties.”165
The Gatto story begins in 2015 when the FBI launched an investigation to uncover bribery schemes involving Division I Men’s
their market value and whether to sign a professional contract; further contending the NCAA
should change its no-agent rule and allow agents to represent baseball players in negotiating
with MLB teams and also change the composition of NCAA members’ Professional Sports
Counseling Programs (PSCPs) to ensure student-athletes obtain the expertise to transition to
professional baseball. “The NCAA’s purpose and its guiding principles behind amateurism
have been under heavy criticism lately, especially considering the $60 billion industry that is
college sports,” id. at 78).
163. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.2.10. The NCAA defines “pay” as the “receipt
of funds, awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the Association for
participation in athletics.” Id.
164. United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.2.11 (“[A professional athlete is] one who receives any kind of
payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing
legislation of the Association.”); see also Andrea C. Closa, Corruption and College Sports: A
Love Story, 42 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 17, 20 (2020) (The NCAA defines “payment”
as “the receipt of funds or awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the
Association for participation in athletics[;]” currently, student-athletes may receive “actual
and necessary expenses” that are directly-related to competition in the sport, including: lodging, meals, apparel, equipment, health insurance, and transportation.).
165. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 339; see Charles Riley, Penn State hit with severe financial
penalties,
CNN
MONEY
(July
23,
2012,
6:29
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/news/economy/penn-state-financial-penalties/index.htm
(reporting that Penn State was fined $60 million by the NCAA and Big Ten conference after
the school’s child abuse scandal); see also Associated Press, No. 12 Seton Hall Placed on
Three Years’ Probation by NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 16, 2019),
https://www.si.com/college/2019/11/16/seton-hall-placed-on-probation-by-ncaa (noting the
NCAA fined Seton Hall $5,000 plus one percent of the men’s basketball budget for the 202021 season resulting from a recruitment violation for a player that ultimately transferred to the
university); see generally Collegiate athletics: Fair Pay to Play Act: Hearing on S.B. 206
Before the Assemb. Comm. on Arts, Ent., Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media, cmt. 5 (20192020) (June 25, 2019) (reporting University of Southern California’s (USC) “opposition[al]
concerns” to the state’s “Fair Pay to Play Act” or SB 206 and noting, in part, a concern that
any reforms be addressed at a national level through the NCAA because state approved law
reforms would place schools in those states at a competitive disadvantage with other national
programs; further warning that “SB 206 would encourage students to violate the NCAA bylaws, [making them] ineligible and putting athletic teams and athletic departments at risk” and
noting that in 2010, because two USC athletes “violated NCAA rules by accepting compensation from sports agents[,]” the USC athletic program “received some of the harshest penalties ever handed down to a Division I program.”).
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Basketball.166 This investigation prompted the United States Attorney’s
Office in the Southern District of New York to announce on September
26, 2017 the arrest of ten persons including agents, coaches, and apparel
company employees alleging a “pay for play” bribe scandal involving
upcoming Division I Basketball players and their families.167 The “pay
for play” bribery scheme violated the NCAA’s longstanding amateurism
rule that prohibits student-athletes and/or their families from receiving
impermissible payments or other benefits to play basketball at a particular university.168 Both the arrest announcement as well as the underlying
investigation surprised NCAA President Emmert and others,169 although
the “dirty little secret” about corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball
was known to many associated with the sport.170
Among those indicted were Adidas executive, James Gatto, Adidas
consultant, Merl Code, and aspiring sports agent, Christian Dawkins.171
They were charged criminally with committing and conspiring to commit wire fraud resulting from the alleged funneling of high school basketball players into Adidas-sponsored Division I programs.172 They
were not charged with violating any sports agent law, such as SPARTA,
underscoring the concern in Part III of this article about the under-enforcement of laws regulating sports agents.173
166. United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019).
167. Lens, supra note 129, at 51 (noting that the FBI multiyear investigation revealed two
related schemes, a “Coach Bribery Scheme” and the “Adidas Scheme.”); see Gatto, 295 F.
Supp. 3d at 339-40.
168. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901 at *2; see Lens, supra note 129, at 50-61 (discussing the adjudication of each defendants’ alleged offense and sanction).
169. Matt Norlander, Ultimate college basketball corruption scandal primer: Explaining
the latest with the FBI probe, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2018, 3:16 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/ultimate-college-basketball-corruptionscandal-primer-explaining-the-latest-with-the-fbi-probe/ (reporting, in part, that the FBI
Gatto investigation began with the Securities and Exchange Commission charging financial
advisor Matt Blazer with fraud who then informed the government that he could show fraud
and corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball recruiting); see also Lens, supra note 129, at
75-76.
170. The Rice Commission Report’s Introduction underscored the widespread knowledge
regarding corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball stating, “The fact remains, however, that
today’s issues have been around a long time, and their existence is widely acknowledged.
Virtually all stakeholders and others providing information to the Commission at some point
uttered the discouraging phrase: ‘Everyone knows what’s been going on.’ ” RICE REPORT,
supra note 14, at 16.
171. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 339.
172. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *4.
173. Jessop, supra note 29, at 199 (“Notably, none of the 10 individuals charged amidst
the FBI’s three-year investigation into alleged corruption and bribery . . . were charged with
violating state or federal statutes related to sports agents.”) (citing U.S. Attorney Announces
The Arrest Of 10 Individuals, Including Four Division I Coaches, For College Basketball
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The Gatto defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.174 They argued at trial that the prosecution improperly utilized the
criminal mail and wire fraud statute to punish those who “cheated” a
private association, the NCAA, by violating its amateurism rules. Stated
differently, violating an NCAA rule does not mean one also has violated
the law.175 In addition, the defendants claimed they actually helped, rather than harmed, the universities by bringing them top high school recruits and by providing financial assistance to the poor and underprivileged families of student-athletes.176 The defendants further claimed that
because they never sought money from the universities, they received no
benefit and thus could not have committed fraud against the universities.177 The defendants also argued the fraud charge was improper because college basketball coaches implicitly asked Adidas to help the student-athletes’ families financially.178
The prosecution argued that a defendant does not need to obtain
money or property to violate the mail and wire fraud statutes; property
can include “ ‘ intangible interests such as the right to control the use of
one’s assets.’ ” 179 By casting the universities as victims of the fraudulent
scheme, the prosecution narrowed in on the defendants’ interference
with the right of such universities to control their assets, the so-called
“right to control” theory.180 Prosecutors argued that the defendants’ actions rendered the recruits ineligible to play college basketball, and the

Fraud And Corruption Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/video/us-attorney-announces-arrest-10-individuals-including-four-division-i-coaches) (providing details of the FBI’s investigation in Gatto and charges against the
ten individuals); see supra Part III Section B, Regulating Sports Agents: The Uniform Athlete
Agents Act (UAAA) and Similar Rules.
174. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 338 (providing the written opinion explaining the court’s
earlier denial in open court on February 15, 2018 denying the defendants’ joint motion to
dismiss the indictment).
175. Id. at 350.
176. Id. at 342.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (citing United States v. Finazzo, 850 F.3d 94, 108 (2d
Cir. 2017)). The prosecution relied on precedent in the Second Circuit to argue that the defendant does not need to obtain the money to violate mail and wire statutes. Id. at 345-46
(holding that “in the Second Circuit one may be convicted of wire fraud without the victim
being ‘out of pocket’ to the defendant” thus this indictment, “adequately charges a conspiracy
to use the wires in furtherance of a scheme by which student-athletes and/or their families—
alleged co-conspirators all—would obtain athletic scholarships, thereby depriving the victims
of money or other property.” Id. at 346 n.56) (citing, in part, Finazzo, 850 F.3d at 108-11, as
endorsing the “right to control theory” and “explicitly [holding] that the deprivation of the
right to control one’s assets can serve as a basis for criminal liability under the mail and wire
fraud statutes.”).
180. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 346.
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additional acts of concealment basically scammed the universities into
doling out scholarships to ineligible players, exposing the universities to
economic harm.181 According to the prosecution’s theory, a defendant
only needs to interfere with a victim’s property rights under the mail and
wire fraud statutes.182
The Gatto court agreed with the prosecution and refused to dismiss
the indictment, finding that the indictment “adequately charges a conspiracy to use the wires in furtherance of a scheme by which studentathletes and/or their families . . . would obtain athlete scholarships,
thereby [interfering with or] depriving the victims of money or other
property.”183 The court stated that “it should surprise no one that knowingly making a false representation in order to get financial aid from a
university could give rise to criminal liability.”184
After a three-week trial and two days of jury deliberation, the jury
unanimously convicted the defendants of wire fraud, finding that defendants had (a) made payments to families of prospective student-athletes
to induce those student-athletes to attend particular NCAA Division I
universities; and (b) caused those student-athletes to submit certifications to the universities falsely stating that they were compliant with
NCAA rules—essentially that they were amateurs.185 Gatto was sentenced to nine months, and Merl and Dawkins were each sentenced to

181. Id.
182. Id. The indictment
alleges also that defendants and their co-conspirators conspired to ‘defraud[] the
universities . . . by depriving the universities of significant and necessary information regarding the non-compliance with NCAA rules by the relevant studentathletes and coaches,’ thereby: ‘[I]nterfer[ing] with the universities’ ability to control their assets and creat[ing] a risk of tangible economic harm to the universities,
including, among other things, decision-making about the distribution of their limited athletic scholarships; the possible disgorgement of certain profit-sharing by the
NCAA; monetary fines; restrictions on athlete recruitment and the distribution of
athletic scholarships; and the potential ineligibility of the universities’ basketball
teams to compete in NCAA programs generally, and the ineligibility of certain student-athletes in particular.
Id. (citing Indictment ¶ 3).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 350.
185. See Lens, supra note 129, at 48, 59-60; see also Will Hobson & Kevin Armstrong,
All Three Defendants Found Guilty of Wire Fraud in College Basketball Corruption Trial,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2018) (reporting “two Adidas officials and an aspiring NBA agent were
found guilty of fraud charges” after a three-year investigation of college basketball, and writing “the jury embraced the government’s theory that, by paying the families of five top recruits
amounts ranging from $2,500 to $90,000, in violation of NCAA rules, the men defrauded
Louisville, Kansas and North Carolina State. The schools would not have awarded scholarships to those recruits if they had known about the illicit payments, prosecutors argued, and
now face possible NCAA sanctions and financial penalties as a result.”).
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six months in federal prison in order to send a “great big warning light
to the basketball world.”186
A. The Rice Commission—“Everyone knows what’s been going on.”187
The public notoriety and related outrage surrounding the Gatto
scandal forced the NCAA to take quick and public action to address the
corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball. Shortly after the announcement of the charges, NCAA President, Mark Emmert, stated on October
11, 2017, that it is “very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive
changes to the way we operate, and [to] do so quickly.”188 He further
stated, “[w]hile I believe the vast majority of coaches follow the rules,
the culture of silence in college basketball enables bad actors, and we
need them out of the game. We must take decisive action. This is not a
time for half-measures or incremental change.”189
As a first and familiar step in the NCAA’s crisis management playbook,190 Emmert announced that the NCAA Board of Governors, the Division I Board of Directors, and the NCAA President were appointing a
Blue-Ribbon Commission, the Commission on College Basketball, or
commonly known as the Rice Commission after its chair, Dr. Condoleezza Rice.191 The Rice Commission’s members included a nationally prominent group of experts hailing from academia, athletic departments, professional basketball, and private industry.192

186. Lens, supra note 129, at 59; see United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019) (“All [three] defendants were
charged with and convicted on one count of participating in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud
and one count of wire fraud in connection with an alleged scheme to defraud the University
of Louisville. Defendant James Gatto alone was charged with and convicted of one additional
count of wire fraud in connection with an alleged scheme to defraud the University of Kansas.”); see also Redacted Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 14, United States v. Gatto, 295
F. Supp. 3d (2d. Cir. Aug. 8, 2019) (No. 19-0783, 0786, 0788).
187. This quote is a sobering, if not deeply disturbing, prefatory statement in the Rice
Report’s Introduction. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 16; see also infra note 169. The Commission further stated, “Virtually all stakeholders and others providing information to the
Commission at some point uttered this discouraging phrase.” RICE REPORT, supra note 14,
at 16 (emphasis added).
188. Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission on College Basketball, NCAA (Oct. 11, 2017, 1:55 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/statement-president-mark-emmert-formation-commission-college-basketball.
189. Id.; see also RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15.
190. See Branch, supra note 2 (discussing, in part, collegiate athletic scandals and three
NCAA Knight Commissions Reports, the first occurring in 1991, that addressed corruption
and commercialism in college sports and calling for more control by college presidents).
191. For a list of the Rice Commission’s distinguished members, see infra note 192.
192. Dr. Condoleezza Rice chaired the blue ribbon commission; its members included
Mary Sue Coleman, President, Association of American Universities; General Martin E.
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The Rice Commission’s mandate was clear and broad: “ ‘ examin[e]
critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working’ and [to] focus on
three areas.”193 The first area was to examine “[t]he relationship between
the NCAA national office, its members, their student-athletes and
coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, non-scholastic
basketball and athlete agents and advisors.”194 The Rice Commission’s
charge—to examine the relationship between “athlete agents and advisors” with the NCAA and others, apparel companies, for example—signaled a potential seismic shift in the landscape of intercollegiate athletics. This article discusses only the Rice Commission’s examination and
recommendations concerning the NCAA’s relationship with “athlete
agents and advisors” that was part of the Commission’s first focus
area.195
The Rice Commission’s initial key task consisted of “gathering information and expert opinions for making ‘transformative recommendations’” to the Division I Board of Directors and NCAA Board of Governors “on legislation, policies, actions, and structure(s) to protect the
integrity of college sports, with a focus on Division I Men’s Basketball.”196 The Rice Commission highlighted an important, albeit unpleasant, fact at the outset of its report. Based on “virtually all” of the persons
the Rice Commission heard from, it recognized that “the challenges
identified in this report have been part of the landscape of pre-professional basketball for many years, and that others have previously made
serious efforts to address them with only limited success.”197 The Rice
Dempsey, U.S. Army Retired, Chairman, USA Basketball; Jeremy Foley, Athletics Director
Emeritus, University of Florida Athletic Association; Jeffrey Hathaway; Vice President/Director of Athletics, Hofstra University; Grant Hill, Owner/Vice Chairman, Atlanta Hawks;
Rev. John I Jenkins, C.S.C., President of University of Notre Dame; Mike Montgomery, Retired Basketball Coach, Analyst, PAC-12 Networks; David Robinson, Founder, Admiral Capital Group; Kathryn Ruemmler, Former White House Counsel, Partner, Latham & Watkins
LLP; Gene Smith, Sr., Vice President and Wolfe Foundation Endowed Athletics Director,
Ohio State University and John Thompson III, Board of Directors, National Association of
Basketball Coaches. Members were appointed for an initial six-month term with the expectation that they would provide the NCAA Boards with a report for their April 18, 2018 meetings.
RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15-16.
193. Id. at 15. This article focuses on the first area. The remaining two areas are beyond
this article’s scope. For a description of the other two focus areas, see infra note 194.
194. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15 (emphasis added). The Rice Commission’s second focus area concerned the “relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the
challenging effect of the NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one and done
phenomenon in men’s college basketball.” Id. The final focus area asked the Commission to
consider the “creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions and
its national office to promote transparency and accountability.” Id.
195. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
196. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 16.
197. Id.
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Commission emphasized that “these challenges have become more
prominent in the past decade as elite basketball–pre-college, in-college
and post-college–has become exponentially more lucrative.”198 In short,
the Rice Commission grasped the enormous difficulty it faced in transforming the pre-professional basketball culture to protect the integrity of
intercollegiate athletics.199
The Commission heard from a variety of stakeholders and others,
even opening a portal and soliciting public input.200 For example, the
Commission heard directly from the NBA, the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), USA Basketball, numerous NCAA offices and
departments, athletic conferences, apparel companies, agents, college
and high school coaches associations, student and faculty associations,
athletic directors’ associations, other interested associations and groups,
the Uniform Law Commission, athletes, and other individuals.201
The Commission devoted considerable attention to the question regarding the appropriate role of agents and whether agents should have
access to athletes.202 The Rice Commission noted that NCAA rules bar
students and/or their family members and other representatives from entering into any oral or written contracts on the athlete’s behalf for “purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation for financial gain,

198. Id.(“Everyone knows what’s been going on.”).
199. Id. at 1. The Rice Report concluded
[i]t has taken some time to get here, and it will take time to change course. The
Commission offers it recommendations knowing that the road ahead is long–but
that the first steps must be . . . bold . . . . The indictments handed down by the Justice
Department and the ongoing FBI investigation spurred the NCAA to ask for this
report. [R]adical changes are long overdue. We the commissioners believe that this
is a final opportunity to turn the course of college basketball in the right direction.
Id.
200. Id. at 17.
201. Id.
202. The Rice Commission’s discussion about agents occurs in the following sections of
its report. See RICE REPORT supra note 14.
1) Executive Summary of Recommendations § 1: Realistic Pathways for Student-Athletic Success, C. Permit Students to Receive Meaningful Assessment of Professional Prospects Earlier with Assistance From Certified Agents. Id. at 6-7;
2) Report of the Commission, Summary Identification of the Issues, B.2. Substance,
Including Penalties, ¶ Agents. Id. at 23-24;
3) Report of the Commission, Recommendations § 1: Realistic Pathways for StudentAthletic Success, C. Permit Students to Receive Meaningful Assessment of Professional Prospects Earlier with Assistance from Certified Agents. Id. at 33-35.
It identified and discussed the issue or topic of agents and advisors after first considering the
NCAA’s “Amateurism” principle and underscoring the close connection between the two topics.
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even if that agreement is limited to future representation.”203 The
NCAA’s longstanding concern about agents having access to studentathletes and the threat it poses to the NCAA’s amateurism principle is
poignantly illustrated by its ban on student-athletes receiving any benefits “from agents even [when] those benefits do not have strings visibly
attached.”204
NCAA stakeholders testifying before the Commission essentially
reflected three schools of thought regarding agents’ access to athletes.
One school of thought argued that agents should have early access to
athletes at the beginning of each college academic year and perhaps as
early as high school.205 They believed athletes and their families lacked
sufficient knowledge about collegiate, post-collegiate, and professional
options to allow them to develop a “path for success.”206 This knowledge
deficiency, and the tendency of athletes and their families to misjudge
the athlete’s professional prospects, hamper their ability to develop the
best plan for advancing the athlete’s interests.207
The Commission noted that many elite high school and college basketball players believe they will play professional basketball, but the data
suggests that belief is unfounded.208 Only approximately one and twotenths percent of men’s basketball players advance to the NBA, the most
prized professional basketball league.209 Nevertheless, a Rice Commission study showed that fifty-nine percent of Division I players expect to
play professional basketball.210 Even more striking is additional NCAA
research that shows seventy-six percent of Division I, forty-eight percent
of Division II, and twenty-one percent of Division III basketball players
think “they have a chance to play at the next level.”211 Such expectations
of playing at the “next level” are simply unwarranted given existing data.
203. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23 (“Prohibited marketing includes negotiations with
professional teams, seeking product endorsements, and efforts to place an athlete at a particular school.”).
204. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 12.3.1, 12.3.1.2, 12.2.1, 12.3.3,
12.3.1.3).
205. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 5.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 (citing So, you’re telling me there’s a chance…,
NCAA (Dec. 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/so-you-re-telling-methere-s-chance). Immediately following these percentages in the Rice Report, the Commission
opines:
[E]rroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind of misjudgment that should
deprive student-athletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college or to continue
in college while playing basketball. While this rule change may inconvenience
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Some stakeholders offered a second school of thought about agents.
They contended that agents are determined to contact prospects and persons who may influence them and that agents will find ways to circumvent NCAA restrictions on such athlete-agent contact.212 After all, an
agent’s recruitment of a top athletic prospect is a long, complex undertaking fraught with surprises, disappointment, and no guarantees of success, much like participating in the grueling Alaska Iditarod Sled Dog
Race.213 Agents are always looking for some advantage over competitors to land such elite talent. Indeed, this group of stakeholders told the
Rice Commission that they believe that agents are already contacting
elite high school and collegiate players to gain a competitive advantage
in representing them.214
The third school of thought, embraced by some agents, believes that
allowing agents to contact high school athletes will enable agents to help
with important decisions at an even earlier stage in the athlete’s decision
making.215 For example, the agent would presumably advise the athlete
about the selection of a non-scholastic coach, such as an academy or club
level coach; which high school to attend; which “showcase” tournaments
to play in; and which brand of equipment and apparel to use, such as,
Nike, Adidas, or Under Armour.216 These stakeholders advocate for
higher “barriers to entry” for professional agents seeking access to student-athletes.217 A more stringent certification process would ensure
agents are competent and possess the requisite good character to serve
coaches seeking to set their rosters for the following season, we conclude that the
student-athlete’s interest should govern here. A player chagrined to discover that he
lacks an NBA future may grow into his collegiate experience and adopt a different
plan of the future.
The Commission concludes “[i]n sum, student-athletes should have more information about
their professional prospects and more flexibility to test those prospects and return to school.
This change and other related changes should make it easier for them to do so without losing
their collegiate eligibility.” Id. at 6.
212. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23-24.
213. See also JERRY MAGUIRE (Gracie Films 1996) (chronicling Maguire’s rise to becoming a successful agent and noting that at one point Maguire had so many clients he could
barely keep track of them; and showing how Maguire spent almost 100 percent of his time on
the road travelling to recruit athletes and make lucrative deals). Sports agent Jerry Maguire,
played by Tom Cruise, was at the height of his career where he had so many clients that he
did not care about any of them. Maguire was a road warrior spending most of his time travelling for deals. Maguire is fired by his firm when he pens a letter to his office saying agents
should care more about their clients than they do about the money. Upon his termination, only
one client (a baseball player) stayed with him. See id.
214. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23-24.
215. Id. at 24.
216. Id. (“recognizing that the NBPA has recently taken important steps to improve the
quality of the agent cadre”).
217. Id.
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as fiduciaries for student-athletes.218 This group of stakeholders calls for
higher penalties for agents who violate NCAA rules, either through enforcement of state and other laws or by reporting violations to the
NBPA.219
The Rice Commission accepted the collegiate model of athletics as
the premise for making its reform recommendations.220 The key purpose
of that model, according to the NCAA, “is to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as
an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.”221 Member institutions are responsible for ensuring that their
athletic programs comport with NCAA rules, including the No Agent
Rule, that are designed to implement the NCAA’s basic purpose of keeping collegiate athletics non-professional.222 The NCAA’s longstanding
commitment to the principle of amateurism is the cornerstone of its lucrative business model, and agents have been viewed historically as a
threat to that fundamental principle. Thus, the Commission’s recommendations were designed with the stated goal of supporting and furthering the NCAA’s basic purpose of maintaining amateurism and also
encouraging its members to accept responsibility for achieving that purpose.223
The Rice Commission recommended that the NCAA permit students to receive a meaningful assessment of their professional prospects
with the assistance of certified agents at an earlier time in their decision
making process.224 This recommendation is clearly premised on the
NCAA and its member institutions adopting a certification process for
agents with “strict standards” that would warrant their earlier contact
with student-athletes.225 The NCAA and member institutions would be
218. Id. at 33. Although the precise contours of any certification regime for agents is beyond the scope of this article, that regime should require that there be clear and convincing
evidence of a violation before sanctioning an agent. This intermediate evidentiary standard of
proof takes into consideration the significant property and other interests that an agent has in
providing such services and the need to protect the athlete and public from bad agents. Cf.
MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 18.3 (establishing the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard as the basis for sanctioning or disciplining lawyers for violating professional responsibility norms in the legal services field).
219. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 24.
220. Id. at 28.
221. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1).
222. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.1.1).
223. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 2.1.1, 2.2 1).
224. Id. at 3. The precise wording of the Recommendation follows: § 1: “Realistic Pathways for Student-Athlete Success,” C. “Permit Students to Receive Meaningful Assessment
of Professional Prospects Earlier With Assistance From Certified Agents.”Id.
225. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 33.
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authorized to allow “certified agents to engage with student-athletes at
school at specific times during the calendar year.”226 Not surprisingly,
the Commission noted that the NCAA “must appoint a Vice-President
level executive to develop detailed [NCAA certification standards] and
[to] administer the program.”227 In addition, the NCAA “should also
educate elite [basketball players] about NCAA eligibility rules . . . [and
their] professional prospects.”228
The Commission noted that currently, student-athletes may retain
lawyers and advisors to obtain professional services provided they do
not perform the representational activities of agents, namely negotiating
directly with colleges or professional teams to obtain a benefit or payment related to the student’s athletic services or reputation.229 The Commission also recommended that “high school players considering entering the draft should be allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and
advisors just as high school baseball players may engage agents for advice about the draft.”230 The Commission learned that agents or their
associates are sometimes directly or indirectly paying many elite athletes
and/or their families as early as their sophomore year in high school.231
Current NCAA rules prohibit this practice and also bar players and their
families from orally or in writing agreeing to be represented by an
agent.232 “Virtually all agents” who spoke to the Commission advised it
not to allow high school or college athletes or their families to enter into
agreements with agents in advance of their professional careers—such a
practice would increase the influence of corrupt agents.233 Nevertheless,
these agents argued that the NCAA should allow “good” agents “to talk

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 34.
230. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.3.1.1).
231. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34.
232. Id.; see Walters & Bloom v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
that an agreement entered into by running back Brent Fullwood with a sports agency during
the football season of his senior year of college for representation rights at the NFL draft was
unenforceable as the agreement violated public policy because Fullwood signed the agreement
before becoming eligible to sign).
233. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34. Contrary to the advice of these agents, the Rice
Commission ultimately recommended that elite Division I Men’s Basketball and high school
players “should be allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and advisors . . . for advice
about the draft.” Id. The Commission presumably determined that athletes’ “desperate” need
for such agent access and information about the draft and more outweighed these agents’ concerns about the influence of corrupt agents. See id. In addition, the Rice Commission addressed this concern about “corrupt agents” by “recommend[ing] serious consequences,” including decertification, for agents who violated acceptable agent representation rules. Id. at
35, 43.
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with high school and collegiate players [to] make their cases so that players would have all available options before . . . [entering] the professional market.”234 The Commission agreed and directed the NCAA certification program to offer such opportunities for “good” agents.235
The Rice Commission’s recommendations about agents reflects its
finding that athletes misjudge their professional prospects. The Commission concluded that high school and college athletes should be permitted to contact NCAA certified agents to avoid any misunderstanding
about their prospects.236 The families of these athletes also should be
permitted to obtain objective, credible evidence about their athlete’s professional prospects from agents.237 All students and their families “need
timely, reliable and trusted sources of information about their likelihood
of professional success.”238 The Commission recommended that the
NCAA should bring into the light all discussions between certifiedagents and elite student basketball players concerning their professional
prospects.239 This recommendation would help ensure that “good”
agents feel safe in communicating with and providing desperately
needed information to student-athletes about their professional and other
prospects.240
V. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE—OPENING ACCESS TO
SPORTS AGENTS FOR ALL STUDENT-ATHLETES
Student-athletes, most of whom are adolescents, constitute a special
population on most university campuses with unique challenges and
needs that differ from their non-athlete peers.241 In particular, studentathletes devote considerable time and effort to athletics, not just to their
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34.
Id.
Joy Gaston Gayles, The Student Athlete Experience, 144 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL
RES.
33
(Dec.
2009),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229574190_The_student_athlete_experience. The term adolescence generally describes
the transitional period from childhood to adulthood (ages ten to twenty-four years)—a “developmental epoch during which children become adults intellectually, physically, hormonally, and socially.” Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 449 (2013) [hereinafter Arain]. Medical and
other experts report that this is a “tumultuous time, full of changes and transformation.” Id.
Most collegiate student athletes are adolescents. “Brain maturation” during this time may be
influenced by several factors, for example, “heredity, environment . . . nutritional status . . .
physical, mental, economical, and psychological stress; drug abuse (caffeine, nicotine, and
alcohol) and sex hormones . . . .” Id. at 450.
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academics and future employment prospects.242 Such devotion
prompted one expert to conclude, “[b]alancing the combination of the
time commitment of intercollegiate athletics, the academic expectations,
and the avenues of social relationships, student-athletes are presented
with a level of transitional stress that no other students have to face
. . . .”243 Another group of psychologists and sports experts similarly
noted,
[a]lthough there is variability from school to school, sport to sport,
and time of year, the unique physical and psycho-social demands of
often year-round training, competition, travel, and increasing pressure to perform academically can compromise their health status
more than others . . . . In view of similar lifestyle concerns and other
issues (e.g., social isolation, identity conflicts, career-vocational issues, fear of failure and success) . . . [these experts] suggested that
student-athletes represent a population that is probably ‘at risk’ to

242. Gayles, supra note 241, at 33. See Provencio, supra note 19, at 4. “[B]etween 11%
and 23% of student-athletes had paying jobs in addition to school and athletics” according to
the 2015 GOALS Study. Id. at 7.
The percentage of Division I athletes with jobs were FBS football players at 23%.
The average hours per week worked rose from 8.1 hours per week in 2010 to 8.8
hours per week in 2015. Among Division I athletes 36% of men and 40% of women
reported that they would like to spend more time working at a job.
Id. See also Edward F. Etzel et al., Understanding and Promoting College Student-Athlete Health: Essential Issues for Student Affairs Professionals, 43 NASPA J. 518, 521
(2006) [hereinafter Etzel]. “Under the regular close scrutiny of coaches, compliance officers, the media, and influential others, student athletes must somehow learn how to
balance the numerous demands and expectations of school, sports, and social and personal development on a daily basis.” Id.
243. See Joseph P. Williams, The Influence of the Components of Psychosocial Mentoring
on the Academic, Athletic, and Social Outcomes of Male Student Athletes (Sept. 2017) (unpublished
Ed.D.
dissertation,
Northcentral
University),
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1964266641?pq-origsite-%20gschola
(noting
“[s]tudent-athletes may benefit from positive mentoring relationships” and discussing the athlete’s coach as such a mentor; stating that “[a] mentor assists the protégé by providing support,
direction, and counsel as he or she achieves this task”). It is important to note that “[a] substantial body of research suggested that college student-athletes may be at-risk for developmental obstacles, in addition to facing the same developmental challenges that their non-athletes peers do.” Id. See also Etzel, supra note 242.
Despite the fact that student athletes confront the same long-standing developmental
tasks of other college-age students (e.g., becoming independent, finding a sense of
purpose, coping with uncertainty, dealing with authority, clarifying values) . . . it is
clear that on top of their developmental challenges, athlete lifestyles, competitive
pressures, and daily experiences are quite unlike those of their nonathlete peers.
Id. at 520. “Others have observed that considerable numbers of [student-athletes] suffer
from clinical mental health problems that warrant professional attention.” Id. at 521.

2020]

THE NCAA’S “NO AGENT RULE”

43

experience a range of distressful reactions linked to general health
and mental health.244

The NCAA Growth, Opportunities, Aspirations, and Learning of
Students (GOALS) in College Survey periodically collects information
from student-athletes to enable NCAA committees, policymakers, and
member institutions to better understand student-athletes.245 The
GOALS College Survey in 2016 revealed that student-athletes, both men
and women and across all divisions, spent more time on athletic pursuits
than the last GOALS survey in 2010.246 For example, the median time
devoted to Division I athletics rose from thirty-two hours per week in
season in 2010 to thirty-four hours per week in season in 2015.247 “FBS
football players . . . report[ed] the highest weekly in-season time commitments [with a] median 42 hours per week, up from 39 hours in
2010[].”248 Two-thirds of Division I and II student-athletes spent at least
as much or more time offseason on athletics as during the competitive
season.249
Beside the challenge of committing a large amount of time to athletics, student-athlete success in sports, academics, and a career, may be
further complicated because of sports-related personal injuries,250

244. See Etzel, supra note 242, at 521 (reporting that an investigation into various aspects
of student-athlete health found “that alcohol, dysfunctional eating behaviors and related clinical issues (e.g., eating disorders), coping with injury, keeping up with academics, and general
stress were prominent health-related problems that point to the need for comprehensive
healthcare planning and services for this group”).
245. NCAA GOALS Study of the Student-Athlete Experience Initial Summary of Findings
January
2016,
NCAA
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/GOALS_2015_summary_jan2016_final_20160627.pdf
[hereinafter
NCAA
GOALS]. See Provencio, supra note 19, at 5-6. The NCAA GOALS is a survey study concerning various matters that affect a student-athlete, for example, one’s athletic and academic
experience, recruiting, finances and time commitments. The GOALS survey occurred in 2006,
2010 and 2015. Id. at 24.
246. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2.
247. Id. (noting that the median time spent on Division II athletics increased from thirty
hours per week in season in 2010 to thirty-two hours per week in season in 2015 and for
Division III the median time increased from twenty hours per week in season in 2010 to
twenty-eight and a half hours per week in season in 2015).
248. Id. (reporting that FCS football and Division I baseball spend forty or more hours per
week and, among women’s sports, Division I softball registered the highest weekly figure at
thirty hours).
249. Id. (revealing that at least seventy-five percent of Division I and II student athletes
in baseball, football, and men’s and women’s track spend as much time off season in their
sport as in-season).
250. See Etzel, supra note 242, at 521 (highlighting student-athlete injuries and stating
that “coping with injury, keeping up with academics, and general stress were prominent
health-related problems . . . .”).
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fatigue, and even missed classes when their sport is in season.251 “Approximately one-third of student athletes . . . noted struggling to find energy for other tasks because of the physical demands of their sport.”252
Almost one-quarter of the student-athletes surveyed reported being exhausted from the mental demands of their sport and approximately thirty
percent reported feeling “intractably overwhelmed during the past
month,” representing an increase over the 2010 GOALS Study.253 Perhaps even more unsettling, given the arduous schedule and highly structured environment of student-athletes, is the GOALS finding that “nearly
two-thirds of men and three-quarters of women . . . expressed a preference for more opportunities to visit home and family.”254 Similarly, a
“high percentage” of survey participants desired more time for socialization and relaxation, especially among student-athletes with a high
combination of academic and athletic time commitments.255 “The median self-reported weekly time spent socializing/relaxing during the athletic season was 17.1 hours in 2015, down from 19.5 hours in 2010
. . . .”256
In short, the GOALS Study and other literature reflect the formidable time management and health challenges confronting the relatively
small, unique, and vulnerable student-athlete population. Agents can
help mitigate some of these challenges and related concerns, causing

251. Gayles, supra note 241 (reporting student athletes “miss a fair number of classes
when their sport is in season”). Cf. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2 (“Although time
spent on athletics has increased, 2015 reports of missed classes were generally low and very
similar to those seen in 2010.”).
252. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 5 (highlighting that the percentage of studentathletes struggling to find sufficient energy is higher in Division I and in some sports like
football).
253. Id. at 4-5. See Etzel, supra note 242, at 521.
In view of similar lifestyle concerns and other issues (e.g., social isolation, identity
conflicts, career-vocational issues, fear of failure and success), psychologists Pinkerton, Hinz, and Barrow (1989) suggested that student athletes represent a population that is probably ‘at risk’ to experience a range of distressful reactions linked to
general health and mental health.
Id. For example, studies consistently show “that excessive alcohol consumption and negative alcohol-related consequences and behaviors are major health issues among college
students and that intercollegiate athletes are truly an at-risk population in this area.” Id.
at 523 (emphasis added). Studies have showed that student-athletes “average[] more
drinks per week and engage[] in more frequent binge drinking episodes than nonathletes.” Id. at 524. Studies also show that student-athletes are more likely to engage in
the negative consequences of drinking, such as “impaired academic work, getting into
trouble with the police or other authorities, being taken advantage of sexually[,] . . . have
more sexual partners, and perpetrate more sexual violence than nonathletes.” Id.
254. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2.
255. Id. at 4.
256. Id.
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student-athletes to feel less stressed or “overwhelmed” by providing independent counsel and advocacy to further their interests.257 The agent’s
involvement can even assist the student-athlete in mature decision making.258 Research reveals that
where emotional and social influences on judgment are minimized
or can be mitigated and where there are consultants [like sports
agents] who can provide objective information about the costs and
benefits of alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be
just as capable of mature decision making as adults.259

Traditional principles of agency law should facilitate such counsel and
advocacy by agents. It recognizes that agents owe their principals, here
student-athletes, a fiduciary duty of loyalty, the protection of their confidences, competence, and the advancement of their general welfare.260
These fiduciary principals should encourage student-athletes to fully
communicate with and confide in their agent.
Agents offer student-athletes a number of valuable services, including advice about their careers and finances.261 This advice is especially
helpful to student-athletes, many of whom are young and inexperienced
when it comes to career and financial matters. These important matters
warrant student-athlete attention. However, such matters compete for
space in the student-athlete’s busy schedule and structured environment
257. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (noting that some student athletes feel
overwhelmed).
258. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34.
259. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 583-94 (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Adolescents Less Mature] (discussing
the American Psychologist Association’s (APA’s) seemingly inconsistent positions regarding
adolescent decision-making in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that abolished the
death penalty for juveniles under the age of eighteen and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990), where the Court upheld a parental notification requirement with a judicial bypass
option for minors seeking an abortion). The APA argued that an adolescent’s decision making
was not comparable to an adult’s in Simmons while arguing in Hodgson that an adolescent’s
decision making was comparable to an adult’s and making parental notification unnecessary
or less compelling. The authors conclude that developmental science should “contribute to
debates about the drawing of legal age boundaries, but caution[ed]” that it is important to
undertake a “careful and nuanced consideration of the particular demands placed on the individual for ‘adult-like’ maturity in different domains of functioning”—i.e., that adult-like maturity by adolescents depends on the context. Id. at 593.
260. Darren A. Heitner, Duties of Sports Agents to Athletes and Statutory Regulation
Thereof, 7 Dartmouth L.J. 246, 247 (2009) (explaining that upon signing a contract with an
agent, an athlete manifests consent for the agent to act on the athlete’s behalf and subject to
the athlete’s control, imposing fiduciary duties on the agent); see also JOHN P. SAHL, R.
MICHAEL CASSIDY, BENJAMIN P. COOPER & MARGARET C. TARKINGTON, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN FOCUS 241 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds. 2018) (describing the attorneyclient relationship as a fiduciary one).
261. See supra Part III (discussing the various services and role of agents).
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that generally leaves little time for the athlete to undertake matters beyond meeting their significant athletic,262 academic,263 and possible employment responsibilities.264 Devoting sufficient time to these core responsibilities becomes even more challenging for athletes who are also
trying to develop and maintain personal relationships with peers, family,
and others. One psychologist reported “that compared with their nonathlete peers, student-athletes scored significantly lower on measures of
their educational plans, career plans, and mature relationships.”265 The
sobering conclusion from GOALS and other sources is clear. The
amount of student-athlete discretionary time for understanding and engaging in career and financial planning and other endeavors is very limited. Agents potentially offer student-athletes an independent source of
advice and assistance on these matters. Any agent certification process
must require up-to-date education and training in financial and career
planning, including knowledge of alternative career choices, since the
vast majority of student-athletes will not play professionally or for a long
period. The Rice Commission Report acknowledged this important
point when it noted that “[o]nly a very small percentage of NCAA’s
men’s basketball players make it to the NBA (around 1.2%) let alone
have successful careers.”266 The importance of student-athletes, and others, understanding their financial welfare is reflected in the social

262. Cal. Assemb. Hearing re S.B. 206 by the Comm. on Arts, Ent., Sports, Tourism, and
Internet Media (2019-2020) (June 25, 2019). “University studies have found that athletes are
spending thirty-two to forty-four hours a week on their respective sports. The time commitment athletes dedicate make it practically impossible for athletes to obtain outside employment to provide for themselves or families.” Id. at 3.
263. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2.
264. NCAA Research, Results from the 2015 GOALS Study of the Student-Athlete Experience,
NCAA
(Jan.
2016),
http://ncaa.org/sites/default/files/GOALS_convention_slidebank_jan2016_public.pdf.
265. Williams, supra note 253, at 7; see also Steinberg, et al., supra note 259, at 586
(“[A]dolescents are not of equal maturity with respect to the psychosocial capacities listed by
Justice Kennedy in Roper—capacities such as impulse control and resistance to peer influence.”).
266. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5; see generally Grant Sharretts, Why student athletes
should
value
their
education,
PATRIOT
(Jan.
22,
2016),
https://jcpatriot.com/sports/2016/01/22/why-student-athletes-should-value-their-education/
(explaining the importance of student-athlete education finding that while only two percent of
college athletes make it to the pros, a UNC Greensboro study found that sixty percent of 183
student-athletes at UNC-Chapel Hill read between a fourth and eighth grade level; but see
Sara Ganim, NCAA: It’s not our job to ensure educational quality, CNN (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:54
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/01/sport/ncaa-response-to-lawsuit/index.html (arguing
that the NCAA took a drastically different view than its stated “student’s first, athlete’s second” mantra when it stated in response to a UNC former athlete lawsuit that, “it has no legal
responsibility to ensure the academic integrity of the courses offered to student-athletes at its
member institutions.”).
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movement promoting financial capability.267 This movement is endorsed by many governmental and nongovernmental entities in the
United States, including the President’s Advisory Council on Financial
Capability.268 “Financial capability refers to people’s ability to manage
and take control of their finances.”269 Financial capability is particularly
important today with the “weakening of the government-managed economic safety net” that shifts more responsibility to the individual for his
or her “long-term economic security.”270 For example, in coming years,
the government’s underfunding of social security, “the traditional retirement income source,” along with company-sponsored pension programs
“changing from mainly defined benefit programs to mainly defined contribution retirement programs,” underscore the need for individuals, including student-athletes, to be financially capable and to plan for their
retirement.271 “These trends suggest that ordinary consumers should
worry about their long-term economic security and start to manage their
retirement savings in the early years,”272 including during adolescence,
a time when student-athletes and others may be developmentally less
capable of handling such matters.273 Some agents who have registered
267. Jing Jian Xiao, Cheng Chen & Lei Sun, Age Differences in Consumer Financial Capability, 39 INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 387, 387-94 (2015) (“The purpose of this study is to
examine age differences in financial capability” which “is measured by five variables: objective financial literacy, subjective financial literacy, desirable financial capability, perceived
financial capability, and a financial capability index.” Id. at 387.).
268. Id. at 387.
269. Id. (citing Mark Taylor, Measuring Financial Capability and its Determinants Using
Survey Data, 102 SOC. INDICATORS RES., 297 (2011)).
270. Id.
271. Id. See RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (discussing the challenge of retirement from a
professional athlete’s perspective; the same athlete concerns are arguably applicable to student-athletes in college or high school).
Given that most professional athletes have a short career span, an area of vital concern is the athlete’s post-career transition. An NFLPA survey of former football
players revealed that job hopping, emotional and financial problems, and lingering
injuries replace the NFL glamour and glory for many players. One former Washington Redskins player noted, ‘Unless, you are a superstar with tons of money, you
go from a high income . . . to the real world of knocking doors looking for a job.’
Id. at 16.
272. Xiao, supra note 267, at 387; see RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (“The players who
make the smoothest transition are typically those who began early. Hockey Hall of Famer
Tony Esposito believes that the toughest time for an athlete is quitting. ‘From day one an
agent should help a player plan for retirement.’ ” ).
273. See Jennifer J. Valentine & Deborah J. Taub, Responding to the Developmental
Needs of Student Athletes, 2 J. COLL. COUNSELING 164 (1999); see generally Mark Vermillion, Division I Student Athletes’ Perceptions: How Well Does the Athletic Department Promote Student Athlete Development in an Urban-Serving University?, 25 Metro. U. J. 79
(2014), https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/muj/article/view/20563 (explaining the factors
that Division I student-athletes face that affect development and the effectiveness of studentdevelopment initiatives).
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with a professional athletes union, such as the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA), have received some financial training or
materials as part of the union’s certification process.274
Agents can be especially helpful in educating student-athletes about
their financial situation. In addition to operating a daily agent business,
the agent’s success is dependent, in large part, on keeping abreast of recent developments in the sports industries.275 These industries are interconnected to other industries, such as lending institutions, food and beverage manufacturers, and governmental actors, such as the state or local
tax authorities. The agent may have some knowledge of these related
industries that he or she can use to help a student-athlete’s financial planning. Financial education or literacy has the “potential to . . . change
consumer financial behaviors . . . [and] improve financial well-being.”276
Agents can also be a valuable source of information and assistance
in helping student-athletes to understand and plan their career choices.277
The importance of such information to athletes, in general, is reflected,
in part, on at least one professional athletes union’s website sharing information concerning possible off-season employment opportunities.278
Agents working in the sports field should have information and insights
about future career opportunities for a particular athlete. Agents, especially seasoned agents, may have employment leads and a network of
contacts in the sports world to help advance a student-athlete’s career
aspirations.279
The agent constitutes an independent source for such information
and perspective and is less susceptible to the potentially competing

274. See also NFLPA, REGULATIONS AND CODE OF CONDUCT: GOVERNING REGISTERED
PLAYER FINANCIAL ADVISORS (2017), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/FinancialAdvisors/Final%20Financial%20Advisors%20Regs%20October%20
24.pdf.
275. See Jan Stiglitz, A Modest Proposal: Agent Deregulation, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 361,
364-65 (1997) (emphasizing the value of agents by contending that only two groups of persons, agents and people who work for NFL teams, are sufficiently aware of recent league
developments and otherwise possess the requisite expertise to analyze the NFL draft and determine whether or not a student athlete should enter the professional draft).
276. Xiao, supra note 267, at 387.
277. See RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (“Agents often serve a valuable role as counselor.
They help their clients adjust to personal and professional problems. ‘My agent was a good
friend and a steadying influence on me,’ Rudy Tomjanovich said, commenting on his 13-year
NBA career. ‘You need that in a league where the emotions run from red hot to ice cold.’ ” ).
278. NFLPA, CAREER DEVELOPMENT, https://nflpa.com/active-players/career-development (last visited Aug. 30, 2020).
279. See RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (“[A] good agent does more than help a player
convert his athletic skills into financial security. He protects the player’s rights, prepares the
player for a second career, and, as a former baseball executive said ‘keeps the player in a
frame of mind where he can perform best for himself and his team.’ ” ).
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interests of the student-athlete’s institution, especially the interests of
some of its key constituents, such as the athletic director and coaches.
For example, the student-athlete’s basketball coach may desire the athlete’s return to keep his roster set for the following season. The coach’s
self-interest in a set roster could potentially influence the coach’s advice
about entering the draft or seeking a new career to the detriment of the
student-client’s interests. Some coaches may believe that they can filter
out any potential or actual conflicting interests when advising the athlete
about important decisions, such as remaining on the school’s team. Yet
their vested institutional and personal interests in having the student return to play for another season creates a risk that a coach may unconsciously shape his or her advice.280 A coach has a strong self-interest in
fielding a winning team and in maintaining a familiar and comfortable
coaching environment with a set roster. In addition to the risk of a
coach’s unconscious bias, there is another broader concern about the
self-interest of coaches. Their self-interest may lead them to try to minimize any potential third-party influence by agents on the student-athletes. In effect, coaches may seek to construct an informational silo
around student-athletes making access to agents, a source of information
and advice untethered to the athlete’s university, even more important in
broadening the student-athlete’s context for decision-making. It is important to remember that coaches occupy a central and powerful role in
the lives of their student-athletes, perhaps best underscored by the
coach’s determination of which athletes get playing time. This makes it
very difficult for a student-athlete to legitimately question a coach’s actions and having access to an agent may offer the student-athlete a safer
alternative for expressing concerns. The agent can then act as convenient foil for the athlete by raising these same concerns with the coach.
Today, in our media-driven society, it is important for student-athletes to have a strong and positive public image. Such an image is good
for a student-athlete’s self-esteem and for the possibility of generating
additional revenue separate from his or her athletic performances. Although there may not be much value in a student-athlete’s image at the
beginning of his or her college career, “[t]he building of an image starts

280. There is much scholarship in recent years about the risks associated with unconscious
bias. Some of this literature supports the concern that coaches may not appreciate that their
advice and efforts on behalf of the student-athlete is not merely altruistic but instead biased
or motivated by some other reason, such as the coach’s interest in retaining employment or
transferring to a better position. See, e.g., Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of
Whiteness, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1259, 1289-91 (2004).
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early”281 and “[a]gents play a vital role in helping shape and protect their
clients’ interests.”282 Agents and their student-athlete clients will want
to devote considerable time to developing a strategy for cultivating and
promoting the athlete’s image.283 For example, student-athletes, like
their pro-counterparts, can create a fan following on Twitter and other
social media platforms that might translate into future value; for example, when the athlete turns professional and agrees to participate in an
advertising campaign.
A positive image can be developed, “promot[ed] and preserv[ed]”
by “orchestrating or suppressing publicly reported personal actions.”284
For a recent example, consider the New Orleans Saints quarterback,
Drew Brees, and his wife, who donated five million dollars to help Louisiana’s citizens contend with the effects of the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19). This generous donation was nationally reported and
warmly received by the public, given the grave threat posed by the
COVID-19 pandemic.285 This gesture likely enhanced Brees’ public
standing with the Saints franchise, his teammates, the NFL, and the residents of Louisiana and elsewhere. The value of a future Drew Brees
product endorsement has likely increased because of this charitable public act and its subsequent coverage by the media.286 Agents
and
281. Shane T. Johnson, An Athlete’s Primer - Image Development, Protection and Preservation, 15 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3 (1997); see Kristi Dosh, How Student Athletes Can Prepare to
Become Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/343870 (“[S]tudent athletes have to focus on building their channels [or methods for
branding] as early as possible.”); see also Kristi Dosh, Nebraska First To Launch Program
To Help Student Athletes Maximize The Value Of Their Individual Brands, FORBES (Mar. 10,
2020, 11:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2020/03/10/nebraska-first-tolaunch-program-to-help-student-athletes-maximize-the-value-of-their-individualbrands/#53efa5cb6303 (reporting that the University of Nebraska is partnering with Opendorse, a social publishing platform, to develop student-athlete brands with one expert noting
that social media provides the “most immediate and significant opportunity for name, image
and likeness monetization for student-athletes.”).
282. RUXIN, supra note 123, at 15; see Johnson, supra note 281, at 5-6 (discussing the
different types of agency services available to an athlete).
283. Johnson, supra note 281, at 4. Agents will also want to protect the student-athlete’s
image, for example, by making sure there are no unauthorized uses of the athlete’s image.
However, the agent’s efforts during the student-athlete phase of one’s athletic career will be
mostly devoted to cultivating and promoting the athlete’s image rather than taking legal or
other action to protect the image. Id.
284. Id. at 3.
285. Michael Middlehurst-Schwartz, Saints QB Drew Brees to donate $5 Million in Louisiana coronavirus relief effort, USA TODAY (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/saints/2020/03/26/drew-brees-donate-coronavirus-relief-louisiananew-orleans-saints/2916543001/.
286. See Gary Phillips, Drew Brees And His Wife Pledge $5 Million To Help Louisiana
Battle
Coronavirus
Outbreak,
FORBES
(Mar.
26,
2020,
12:31
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/garyphillips/2020/03/26/drew-brees-wife-brittany-pledge-5-
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student-athletes will want to be careful when image building so as not to
violate any NCAA rules “endanger[ing] a scholarship or the ability to
compete in sanctioned competitions.”287 Nevertheless, college athletes
should develop a plan for building an image that can be monetized after
the student-athlete exits the college ranks. The agent and student-athlete
might appoint an advisory committee to advise them about the right strategy for building and cultivating an image. “With proper planning, [the
student-athlete’s agent and other] advisors can help craft and protect a
marketable image that will still have value after the athlete retires from
the arena.”288 As with financial and career counseling, agents offer student-athletes a valuable source of independent advice and support in developing an image. Agents’ attention to these important matters promises to enhance student-athlete welfare by reducing some of the
significant stress from their core responsibilities of athletics, academics,
and a possible job. This is an important benefit that should be available
to all student-athletes.
VII. THE TIME IS RIPE TO REPLACE THE “NO AGENT” RULE—SOME
THOUGHTS FOR A “MODIFIED AGENT” RULE
The NCAA’s “Basic Purpose” in regulating intercollegiate amateur
athletics289 is to govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable, and sportsmanlike manner, and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher education so that the educational experience of the student-athlete is

million-to-help-louisiana-battle-coronavirus-outbreak-hurricane-katrina/#39c216391277.
For an infamous example of publicity with more mixed results consider the notorious incident
involving figure skaters Tonya Harding and Nancy Kerrigan who were competitors, see Johnson, supra note 281, at 3 (noting how “Tonya Harding gained notoriety of the undesirable
type” by conspiring to injure Kerrigan so that Harding would win the skating championship).
287. Johnson, supra note 281, at 5.
288. See id. at 7 (highlighting the importance of monetizing one’s image for retirement
purposes by noting that Michael Jordan earned $44 million in 1995—“$3.9 million in salary
and $40 million in endorsements” and contrasting that with the situation of the boxer, Mike
Tyson, who earned $40 million in prize money and no money from endorsements.”); see also
Akiko Arai, Yong Jae Ko & Stephen Ross, Branding Athletes: Exploration and Conceptualization of Athlete Brand Image, 17 SPORTS MGMT. REV. 97 (2014) (reporting that “managing
brands for athletes is becoming an essential task for agents” and emphasizing this point by
noting that “IMG, the world’s largest sports agency, announced their mission statement as
‘[t]oday, we help hundreds of elite athlete, coaches, industry executives and prestigious sports
organizations maximize their earnings potential and build strong personal brands.’ ” ).
289. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1. The NCAA also mandates that studentathletes be amateurs and that their conduct not cross the line of demarcation between amateurs
and professionals. Id. § 1.3.1 (stating that a core purpose of the NCAA is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral
part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports”) (emphasis added).
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paramount.290 The Basic Purpose further provides that the integration of
intercollegiate athletics into higher education and a focus on the studentathlete’s academic interest will help “to retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate [or amateur] athletics and professional
sports.”291 Thus, the NCAA’s “Basic Purpose” provision reflects the
NCAA’s key principle of amateurism.292 This principle should not be
viewed as mutually exclusive from a policy that would permit studentathletes to contract with sports agents. An agent’s presence in a studentathlete’s life does not automatically transform his or her participation in
amateur collegiate competition into professional sports.293 Even with the
assistance of a sports agent, the student-athlete remains bound by a myriad of other NCAA non-agent rules, such as the NCAA’s twenty-hour
rule that caps the amount of weekly practice time.294 Instead, the NCAA
should view the agent’s role as an aid in helping to maximize the studentathlete’s “educational experience.”295
The NCAA should replace the No Agent Rule with a MAR.296 A
MAR approach to NCAA reform, like the Rice Commission’s
290. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1; see Glenn M. Wong, Warren Zola & Chris
Deubert, Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to Student-Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 553, 557 (2011); Reid, supra
note 159, at 78.
291. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1.
292. Id. §§ 1.3.1, 2.9.
293. See Matthew Stross, The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring Amateurism, 2 MISS.
SPORTS L. REV. 167, 179 (2012) (contending that “merely allowing legal [and arguably agent]
representation during the course of contract negotiations will not destroy the principles of
amateurism[;]” emphasizing that “[c]ollegiate sports and professional sports remain different
in many aspects,” id. at 179; acknowledging that the NCAA has often blurred the lines of
demarcation between amateur and professional sports, id. at 180-83; and noting that while the
NCAA bylaws prohibit the use of agents, “the NCAA allows students to perform essentially
the same actions” [i.e., negotiate contracts with professional sports organizations] on their
own or without expert assistance and still retain their amateur status, id. at 181).
294. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA’s twenty-hour
rule); see also Stross, supra note 293, at 185, 191 (allowing student-athletes to have representation during contract negotiations “does no more to destroy the separation between amateurism and professionalism than the Professional Sports Counseling Panel[,] [a three-person
panel, that an NCAA member school may have to educate and even negotiate with a professional sports organization on behalf of an athlete] currently does.”).
295. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1; see also William W. Berry III, Educating Athletes Re-Envisioning the Student-Athlete Model, 81 TENN. L. REV. 795, 803-04, 82526 (2014) (examining the NCAA’s amateurism principle and its intersection with the commercial realties of intercollegiate football and basketball and suggesting, in part, that six-year
scholarships and an academic in-season load reduction to three credits as “improving the ability of student-athletes to be students” by allowing them more time for a “robust” educational
experience).
296. MAR stands for Modified Agent Rule. See supra note 95 (noting the NCAA adopted
the Rice Commission’s recommendation to modify the NCAA’s No Agent Rule and permit
agents for elite basketball players).
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recommendations, recognizes and attempts to preserve the NCAA’s
overriding commitment to a policy of amateurism. Although a complete
and detailed description of a MAR is beyond the scope of this article,
any NCAA MAR should ideally embrace the following key elements.
First, and most importantly, a MAR should permit all college student-athletes, irrespective of their division or conference affiliation, to
enter into a written agreement with a NCAA-certified “agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that
sport.”297 Allowing every student-athlete to engage the services of an
agent would facilitate the integration of athletics into higher education
by allowing the student-athlete to devote more time to academics, athletics, and perhaps employment. 298 Some student-athletes may not be
interested in agent representation, and some agents may not have an interest in representing athletes whose professional or commercial prospects are minimal.299 The intensely competitive marketplace to play

297. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.3.1. The quoted language in the text is from
the current NCAA “no agent” rule that forbids any student-athlete from entering into any oral
or written agreement for the purposes of marketing the athlete’s athletic ability. The MAR
breaks with this longstanding “no agent” tradition by permitting such agreements, but only in
writing; memorializing and impressing upon the agent and the student-athlete the seriousness
of their services agreement. The current NCAA’s “no agent” rule for enrolled elite basketball
players or prospective players requires the student athlete to terminate the written sports agent
agreement “before full-time enrollment in the ensuing academic term” if the student-athlete
does not sign a contract with a professional team. See id. § 12.3.1.2.5. The failure to terminate
the sports agent agreement renders the athlete ineligible for NCAA competition. A MAR
should not require the termination of the sports agent agreement and instead should permit an
on-going relationship between the agent and the student-athlete in which the agent provides
important counseling benefits to the student, for example, providing financial and career planning advice among other matters. Unlike the current NCAA rules, a MAR would permit an
athlete to enter a sports agent agreement with an agent for representation in future professional
sports negotiations. Contra id. § 12.3.1.3. Also, any MAR should continue the new NCAA
rule exempting a “prospective or enrolled student-athlete [from having] to compensate an
NCAA-certified agent for his or her services.” Id. § 12.3.1.2.6. Following the student’s completion of his or her eligibility for a sport, the agent should be entitled to the reasonable cost
of his or her post-eligibility services and related expenses.
298. See supra Part V (discussing how agents can help student-athletes find more time to
focus on these core responsibilities). See also Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations
Related to the Use of Agents in the Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best
of Interest of the Amateur Athletics?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215 (2005)); see also Edelman, supra note 95, at 215 (rejecting the NCAA’s claim that its no-agent rule’s goal is to
protect student-athletes because the rule exposes them to significant harm by prohibiting them
from having an agent or competent representation to deal with professional sports organizations and the complex business and legal issues that the surround the world of professional
sports, id. at 215-16).
299. An agent’s interest in representing a certain student-athlete may extend beyond the
mere possibility of negotiating a future professional sports contract. For example, a student
athlete may have little prospect of playing for a professional sports team but nevertheless
possesses other market or commercial value. The athlete may be able to work for a team’s
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professional sports will help determine which student-athletes are likely
to have an agent’s services.
As the Rice Commission highlighted, the NCAA “must appoint a
Vice-President level executive to develop meaningful standards for
NCAA certification and administer the program” to protect student-athletes from bad agents.300 This Rice Commission mandate for vice-president executive level support for an agent certification program should
be an essential part of any future MAR, signaling the importance of the
MAR to agents and other NCAA stakeholders, such as student-athletes
and coaches. In addition, the NCAA should adopt some provisions of
the RUAAA, especially its detailed registration provisions.301
The NCAA must be committed to enforcing the MAR against miscreant agents. Adequate resources and a willingness to enforce the MAR
is critical to having a viable agent regulatory regime.302 The NCAA’s
agent certification department should keep in close contact with its state
and federal counterparts to make sure miscreant agents appearing before
the NCAA will not continue similar misdeeds at the professional level.
Close contact with state and federal agent regulatory bodies also could
alert the NCAA to agent misconduct at the professional level, enabling
the NCAA to take preemptive action against bad agents to protect student-athletes.

business or public relations office or act in a television commercial unrelated to sports, such
as promoting heath club memberships or selling clothes.
300. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6.
301. RUAAA, supra note 127, § 4 (Athlete Agent: Registration Required: Void.) and § 5
(Registration As Athlete Agent: Application Requirements: Reciprocal Registration.). Other
RUAAA provisions that warrant serious consideration for a MAR include section 10, which
requires an agency contract signed by all parties to include “a description of the services to be
provided to the athlete . . . the amount and method of calculating consideration to be paid by
the student athlete for the [agent’s] services . . . .”, id. § 10; section 14 was recently amended
in July 2019 to comport with the Rice Commission’s recommendations that were implemented by the NCAA in August 2018, id. §14; and section 16, which offers a student-athlete
and his or her educational institution the right to sue the athlete agent for damages stemming
from a RUAAA violation and notes that any RUAAA violation constitutes an unfair trade or
deceptive practice, implicating possible federal oversight under SPARTA, id. § 16. See
RUAAA, supra note 127; see also supra Part III Section B (discussing SPARTA and how
violations of it are treated as unfair trade practices).
302. See RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 (“[T]he Commission heard from many commenters who identified both the NCAA’s enforcement process and the substance of the
NCAA’s rules as inadequate to deal with the challenges presented by Division I Men’s Basketball.”). A potential funding source for the enforcement of a MAR could come from the
registration fees paid by sports agents to the NCAA. A similar funding model exists in some
states where a portion of the lawyer registration or license fees are directed to lawyer regulation. See SAHL, supra note 260, at 45. Additional funding sources would likely be necessary
to cover the cost of the NCAA’s regulation of sports agents.
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The NCAA’s “Vice-President level executive” for agent certification should attempt to separate the functions of registration, investigation, prosecution, and adjudication within the NCAA certification office
in hope of avoiding any conflicts of interest and due process concerns.303
For example, an NCAA employee who encountered difficulties with an
applicant for certification should not subsequently be involved in investigating or possibly disciplining that same applicant. This separation of
functions, involving different NCAA personnel, should help foster neutral fact finding and an independence of judgment, thus producing fairer
determinations. Separating these regulatory functions should also reassure agent-respondents that due process is part of the NCAA agent disciplinary process.304
It is important that agents not be viewed as adversaries but rather as
partners of the NCAA and any other state or federal regulatory effort to
protect and enhance student-athlete interests. As partners with the
NCAA, a MAR should require agents who know of another agent’s misconduct to report that agent to the NCAA’s agent certification department and/or an appropriate college’s NCAA compliance office. A similar self-reporting requirement model exists in the legal profession where
lawyers are required to report a fellow lawyer’s misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary authority.305 The failure of lawyers to honor the
reporting requirement constitutes professional misconduct and subjects
them to discipline, including suspension or disbarment.306 Adoption of
a similar reporting requirement for agents should help incentivize their
full compliance with a MAR.
303. See LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32529, THE NCAA AND
DUE PROCESS: LEGAL ISSUES (2004). A congressional research report was conducted in 2004
reviewing and analyzing the NCAA v. Tarkanian and NCAA v. Miller decisions determining
that the NCAA’s actions to investigate and enforce its rules is beyond state regulation. Id.
304. See Aidan Middlemiss McCormack, Seeking Procedural Due Process in NCAA Infractions Procedures: States Take Action, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 261 (1992). See also Due
Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 106 (2004).
305. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). “Reporting Professional Misconduct Conduct, (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Misconduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.” Id. at r. 8.3. Thus, a sports agent’s duty to report another
agent under the ABA approach is triggered only when the agent knows of another’s misconduct that raises a “substantial question” about that lawyer’s fitness to practice. That is a less
onerous standard than some states that require reporting whenever another lawyer’s conduct
raises “a question”—something less than a substantial question—about that agent’s ability to
act as a fiduciary for a student-athlete. See OHIO RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (imposing
a duty to report when there is “a question” of another lawyer’s fitness to practice). See also
SAHL, supra note 260, at 71 (discussing a lawyer’s duty to report misconduct).
306. See SAHL, supra note 260, at 61, 71.
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Although a MAR would permit all student-athletes to have access
to an agent’s services, it should still maintain some restrictions on that
relationship.307 For example, the current prohibition on agents providing
student-athletes payment or other benefits to represent them should be
maintained, as such payments are contrary to the NCAA’s principle of
amateurism.308 As currently the case for only Division I elite basketball
players, a MAR should permit agents to pay athletes’ and their families’
reasonable expenses related to the agent selection process. Such expenses would include travel, housing, food, and related costs. The
NCAA, along with individual colleges and the state office charged with
overseeing agents, should closely monitor the payment of such expenses
to avoid opening a door for abuse. Although there is always some risk
that rogue agents will engage in abusive conduct regarding the reimbursement of expenses related to the selection of agents or in some other
regard, this risk and others are ultimately outweighed by the potential
benefits to student-athletes having agent representation, including agent
counseling, experience, moral support, and advocacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Sports are an important thread in our social fabric, as poignantly
illustrated by the widespread disappointment in the cessation of professional and college sports due to the COVID-19 pandemic.309 Some fans
have struggled to adapt to a life without sporting competitions, not only
in the United States, but globally.310 When sports resume, it will
307. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23-24. The Rice Commission noted that many stakeholders believe that agents should be able to have earlier access to student athletes and that
such access is probably happening already, albeit contrary to NCAA rules. These stakeholders
argued that it is better to have these agent-athlete communications “open and regulated by the
NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by restricting contact to specific times and places.” Id.
308. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.3.1.4 (barring benefits based on athletic
skills from prospective sports agents to student athletes, their family members or friends).
309. See Ryan Lewis, MLB, MLBPA reach agreement on coronavirus shutdown, according to reports, AKRON BEACON J. (Mar. 27, 2020, 6:02 PM), https://www.beaconjournal.com/sports/20200327/mlb-mlbpa-reach-agreement-on-coronavirus-shutdown-accordingto-reports (discussing an agreement between the baseball players union and owners covering
a wide range of issues involving the work stoppage forced by the coronavirus outbreak); see
also Marla Ridenour, UA athletes find positive in Olympic postponement due to coronavirus:
‘This is going to be a huge step for the world coming together’, AKRON BEACON J. (Mar. 23,
2020, 8:04 PM), https://www.beaconjournal.com/sports/20200323/ua-athletes-find-positivein-olympic-postponement-due-to-coronavirus-lsquothis-is-going-to-be-huge-step-for-worldcoming-togetherrsquo (reporting that although “disappointed that their dream will be delayed,” these athletes believe whenever the next games are held it “will be a celebration of the
human spirit as the world unites to fight the deadly virus”).
310. See Peter Landers & Rachel Bachman, Japan, IOC Agree to Postpone 2020 Tokyo
Olympics by About One Year, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2020, 5:57 PM),

2020]

THE NCAA’S “NO AGENT RULE”

57

hopefully usher in a new era where the NCAA continues its long, albeit
flawed, tradition of amateurism with a renewed spirit to protect the interests of student-athletes by eliminating the No Agent Rule and replacing it with a MAR.311

https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-abe-agreed-with-ioc-to-delay-tokyo-olympics-byabout-one-year-11585052548 (“Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and IOC President
Thomas Bach agreed . . . to delay the Games, previously scheduled to start July 24, for around
one year.”); see also Ryan Lewis, MLB to consider realignment, leagues in Arizona and Florida in 2020, according to report, AKRON BEACON J. (Apr. 10, 2020, 10:35 PM),
https://www.beaconjournal.com/sports/20200410/mlb-to-consider-realignment-leagues-inarizona-and-florida-in-2020-according-to-report (reflecting the strong consumer demand for
baseball by stating “[a]t this point, just about any idea to get in as many games as possible in
2020 is on the table;” including having teams play in their spring training facilities that are
located in Florida and Arizona with the winner of the Grapefruit League (FL) playing the
winner of the Cactus League (AZ) for the World Series in November).
311. For articles critically examining the NCAA’s amateurism principle, see generally
Pego, supra note 14; see also Katherine Kargl, Is Amateurism Really Necessary or is it an
Illusion Supporting the NCAA’s Anticompetitive Behaviors?: The Need for Preserving Amateurism in College Athletics, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 379 (2017); see also supra note 29 (identifying additional articles that critically discuss the NCAA’s amateurism principle). For an article more supportive of the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism, see, e.g., McDavis, supra
note 29.

